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Abstract  
In the spring of 1940, roughly twenty two thousand Polish officers, the cream of Poland’s 
intelligentsia, were executed in Katyn forest. While the Soviet Union blamed Nazi Germany for 
the massacre, in the past seventy years all gathered evidence including documents from the Soviet 
archives, point out to the Soviet Union as responsible for the killings. However, the British and 
American governments, who had knowledge of the Katyn Massacre, were engaged in a 
suppression of the truth, during the war and into the early years of the Cold War, even while they 
confronted the Soviet Union over Poland’s independence. The question is why? By examining the 
memoirs of the main officials in Truman administration who were involved in the cover-up—Dean 
Acheson, George Kennan, William Averell Harriman and Truman himself—as well as studying 
the recent declassified 1951-1952 Congressional Report on Katyn Massacre, which shows that 
several U.S. governmental agencies, particularly the State Department, were directly responsible 
for suppressing information about this event, this study offers explanations for the United States’ 
decision to withhold that evidence from the American public. 
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Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware 
lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will 
pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusors 
in order that justice may be done.1 
      Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin (1943) 
                                                                                                                       
Introduction 
Shortly after the outbreak of WWII, roughly fifteen thousand Polish officers were executed 
by the Soviet Union in the spring of 1940 near the Russian city of Smolensk.  When the Germans 
entered the city in the spring of 1943, and discovered the mass graves, they quickly accused the 
Russians of the killings.  The Soviet Union, which was part of the Allied camp since 1941 (with 
Great Britain, and the United States), denied their involvement, and in turn, blamed the Nazis for 
the crime.  A diplomatic debacle erupted thereafter, in which the Polish Government-in-exile 
indicated Moscow’s guilt for the executions, while the Allies for a variety of reasons, chose to 
ignore the murders and suppressed any information in regards to the event.  Even though by late 
summer 1945 the end of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific were officially over, for nearly six 
more years, U.S. policy makers in Washington continued to censor this atrocity in order to keep 
this information hidden from the American people.  It wasn’t until 1951 in which the Katyn 
massacre became public knowledge after the U.S. House of Representatives conducted a massive 
investigation about the affair.  The question therefore becomes why?  Why did President Truman 
and those in his administration continue the policy of concealment of the Katyn tragedy, especially 
since it was his administration that developed strong foreign policy initiatives against the Soviet 
Union almost immediately after the war?  Furthermore, why did Congress only in 1951, after 
                                                          
1 Foreign Policy, “Basic Documents, 1941-49.” Washington, Government Print (1950), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019162257;view=1up;seq=35.  14. See also Moscow Conference 
October 1943. 
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Poland was under the control of the Soviet Union, did they choose to conduct an extensive 
investigation into the deaths of thousands of non-U.S. citizens?              
  In an attempt to answer the above questions, this essay will examine the memoirs, personal 
writings, and testimonies before the Congressional Hearings, of George F. Kennan, William 
Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, and Truman himself, in order to provide possible explanations 
for why, or why not, these individuals remained silent about the murders at Katyn leading up to 
the Congressional enquiry.  The reason for highlighting these individuals exclusively is because 
these political figures, excluding Truman, held key positions within the U.S. State Department 
during both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations (1933-1953).  Each were well aware and 
highly informed about the current events taking place in Poland during and immediately following 
the war.   But several also had close ties to the Soviet Union before, throughout, and after WWII 
as well, which leads one to suspect that they may have had ulterior reasons for not wanting to draw 
attention to the Katyn issue.   
While not all of the above mentioned individuals were necessarily near the epicenter of the 
Katyn controversy, each nonetheless were joined by a common bond in their professional life, and 
played a major part in assisting Truman and others in developing the Cold War policies against 
the spread of communism and Soviet influence around the globe.  It should be noted however, that 
this is not a study which exposes or reveals these individuals as key architects of some vast 
conspiracy to cover-up the Katyn affair.  Instead, the following attempts to explain what persuaded 
these individuals to overlook the Katyn tragedy, and the likely reason(s) as to why.  Moreover, the 
subsequent will endeavor to answer who these individuals believed was responsible for the crime.  
This is particularly important since some, more so than others, had greater access to the evidence 
and details that concluded the Soviets were guilty, but the information they had at their disposal 
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didn’t necessarily translate to who they personally thought was accountable for the Katyn 
massacre.  
In addition, the following will likewise take a closer look at declassified documents from 
the Congressional Hearings (which became available in 2012), in order to demonstrate that there 
was a pro-Communist fervor emanating from within several U.S. governmental agencies during 
and after the war.  Finally, the Katyn controversy will also be discussed on a much broader scale 
as to why studying this historical event is an important case study for understanding why policy 
makers select and choose which wrongdoings by a foreign power should be brought to the attention 
of the American public, and which ones should go relatively ignored.  Most importantly however, 
the subsequent will explain why the murders at Katyn has come to symbolize the sufferings of 
hundreds of thousands of Poles at the hands of the Soviet Union during the Nonaggression period 
of WWII.    
 
What Scholars Say About Katyn and the Cold War 
How does the tale of the summary execution of thousands of Polish officers by the Soviet 
Union differentiate from other mass killings that transpired throughout Second World War?  The 
answer to that question has captivated and intrigued historians, scholars, and journalists alike for 
nearly seventy-years.  At its core, Katyn represented more than just another brutal crime that 
emerged during the WWII period.  Katyn became a lie, an invention, a smokescreen, and most 
importantly, a plot to undermine the sovereignty of an established state: Poland.  It is from this 
perspective contemporary works regarding the story of Katyn were fashioned.  For authors telling 
this story, their endeavors answered three important questions from the ashes of Katyn: Who was 
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responsible for their deaths? How did the world’s most powerful governments during WWII 
respond to this crime? And most importantly, why were the Polish officers killed in first place?  
For the most part, by the end of WWII, the Katyn massacre would fade into obscurity, 
leaving much of the world populace unaware of this event.  Indeed, jubilation over the fall of Nazi 
Germany, Fascism, and Imperial Japan, and seeing justice delivered to war criminals, preoccupied 
the thoughts of Western societies.  However, with the rise of the Soviet Union as a superpower by 
the late 1940s, and the threat of communism spreading around the globe, several notable 
individuals would bring the Katyn affair to the forefront of Western politics.  The overabundance 
of books, articles, and journals written about Katyn, in due course, would call attention to Soviet 
ideology regarding their revolutionary ambitions in achieving a world dominated by communism.  
It is along these lines that publication of The Katyn Wood Murders, authored by Joseph 
Mackiewicz in 1951, became one of the first books which highlighted the Katyn massacre, and 
this work would be the first to emphasize the Soviet’s culpability in the deaths of the Polish 
officers. 
Mackiewicz’s book offers a fascinating and persuasive narrative of the Katyn massacre, 
but his eyewitness account of the mass graves in 1943 is by far the most intriguing aspect of his 
work.  Mackiewicz, a Pole himself, spent much of the war living near the outskirts of the Polish 
city of Wilno (today it’s the Lithuanian city of Vilnius).  During the Soviet occupation of Eastern 
Poland in 1939, Mackiewicz’s radical views against communism forced him to give up his 
profession as a “writer and journalist,” leaving him to quietly take up work as lonely “wagon 
driver.”2  Fortunately for Mackiewicz, by the time the Germans seized control of Eastern Poland 
from the Russians in 1941, they appeared uninterested in his nationalistic views.  However, when 
                                                          
2 Joseph Mackiewicz. The Katyn Wood Murders. London: Hollis & Carter, 1951. 137. 
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the discovery of several mass graves in the Katyn Forest was unearthed by the Nazis during the 
spring months of 1943, the Polish Underground Movement, who fought against Nazi occupation, 
wanted Mackiewicz to go to Katyn and investigate the crime personally.  Mackiewicz explains 
that his initial journey to Katyn had to be approved by the top echelons of the Third Reich.  To his 
great astonishment, the sanctioning of his trek, required “no pledges, no signatures, no compulsion, 
no statement,” the Germans simply wanted him to “see” the slaughter for himself.3  Which of 
course is understandable from the Germans point of view, considering Katyn was now a 
propaganda tool for the Nazis to use against the Soviets and their Western Allies.   
Nevertheless, in May of 1943, Mackiewicz, along with three other reporters and ten factory 
workers from Warsaw, joined the Polish Red Cross at Katyn.  When Mackiewicz arrived at Katyn, 
he wrote extensively on the Polish Red Cross’s exhumations of the corpses, and he thoroughly 
discussed the material evidence that he and others gathered at the scene of the crime.   The decaying 
composition of the bodies, the condition of the victims’ uniforms, and most importantly, the 
volume of personal effects found on the victims, which included 
“letters…newspapers…diaries…prayer books, and medals,” all indicate, according to 
Mackiewicz, that the Polish officers had been killed near the end of April 1940.4  Mackiewicz also 
highlights how the Germans permitted him and other officials complete and unregulated “freedom 
of movement” around the grave sites, in addition, German authorities authorized all those who 
were present at the scene, “to look at anything” or “talk to anyone [they] wished,” without the need 
of an escort.5  Although Mackiewicz contends, that without question, the Nazis wanted to exploit 
the Katyn tragedy for propaganda purposes, their allowance of unfettered outside analyses, stresses 
                                                          
3 Mackiewicz. The Katyn Wood Murders. 139.  
4 Mackiewicz. The Katyn Wood Murders. 144-6.  
5 Mackiewicz. The Katyn Wood Murders. 149. 
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how the Germans clearly wanted to establish to its foreign onlookers that the deceased were not 
tampered by German forces, and that the personal materials could not have been planted prior to 
their visit to the mass graves.  Therefore, as Mackiewicz writes, it was this limitless access that 
gave credence to German claims that the Soviets were indeed responsible for the killings, and not 
the Germans. 
As a whole, Mackiewicz’s book is a gripping and gruesome tale of the Katyn massacre.  
His firsthand encounter with the crime, and his personal reflections on the evidence he and others 
gathered at the scene, leaves little guessing as to “who” was overall responsible for executing the 
Polish officers.  Furthermore, Mackiewicz’s use of personal accounts from former Polish prisoners 
of war, who either escaped from slave labor camps in Russia, or were subsequently released after 
the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed in July of 1941, offers a vivid account to the brutal and 
inhuman conditions these individuals had endured, but not just in the labor camps themselves, but 
in their journey to these camps thereof as well.  Yet, while Mackiewicz is by trade a journalist and 
a writer, and his book reads somewhat like a mystery novel, this is also one of the shortcomings 
of his work.  Behind the scenes of Katyn was more than just a story about the liquidation of POWs.  
He neglected not only the Allied response to this crime, but also how that response affected Anglo-
American-Soviet relations, and how the future of Poland would be decided without representation 
from the official Polish Government-in-exile in London.  This aspect is not discussed in great 
detail in Mackiewicz’s book.  But in fairness to Mackiewicz, perhaps the “who was responsible” 
was more important to emphasize, considering his Polish background, his anti-communist beliefs, 
and his eyewitness experience.6 
                                                          
6 Mackiewicz. The Katyn Wood Murders. 10-19, 137-66.  
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Nearly ten years after Mackiewicz’s book captured the attention of world audiences, came 
the 1962 publication of Death in the Forest; The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre, which is 
perhaps one of the best overall accounts on the Katyn controversy.  Indeed, the book’s author, 
Janusz K. Zawodny, skillfully, critically, and scholarly, “reconstructs” the Katyn crime in immense 
detail.7  Zawodny himself had lived in Warsaw during the Nazi occupation of Western Poland.  He 
initially fought for the Polish Army at the beginning of the German invasion, and eventually 
became a resistance fighter in the Polish underground.  After the war, rather than attempting to 
live under the communist puppet regime of the People’s Republic of Poland, he decided to 
immigrate to the United States.  He later earned a Ph.D. from Stanford University, and went on to 
serve as a historian and political scientist at two prestigious universities: Harvard and Princeton.  
In his book, Zawodny studies all available materials on the Katyn tragedy from 1943-1952.  This 
includes the 1943 Official German Documentary Evidence on the Katyn Case; the 1951-1952 
Congressional Hearings before a House Select Committee, that was charged with investigating the 
Katyn crime on behalf of the United States; all fifteen volumes of the 1947 International Military 
Tribunals, which was tasked with adjudicating war criminals at Nuremburg by war’s end; 
numerous collections of documents concerning Polish-Soviet relations from the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (M.S.Z.); and the Polish Government-in-exile’s Council of Ministers 
confidential reports.  Even the Soviet Official Statement on Katyn, and Joseph Stalin’s personal 
correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill, are all subject to Zawodny’s analysis and inquiries.8  
But beyond Zawodny’s diligent evaluation of numerous primary source material and 
documentation, the added efforts of several noteworthy scholars that guided Zawodny’s research 
                                                          
7 J. K. Zawodny. Death in the Forest; The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre. United States: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1962. ix.  
8 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. xv-xvii.  
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brings a certain level of uniqueness to his telling of the story.  Several of these academics, such as, 
Stanislaw Swianiewicz, Joseph Czapski, and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, shared a personal connection 
to the Katyn affair.  Professor Swianiewicz was a Polish historian and economist, who was the 
only survivor of the Katyn massacre, and as Zawodny writes, was “lucky to have been taken away 
from the vicinity of the slaughter minutes before the execution.”9  As for Joseph Czapski, he 
offered Zawodny “firsthand information” of the harsh conditions of the Soviet prison camp 
Starobelsk—where Czapski himself was interned, and where several hundred victims at Katyn had 
also been imprisoned.10  And Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who had succeeded Wladyslaw Sikorski as 
Prime Minster of the Polish Government-in-exile (1943-1945), provided Zawodny with his 
valuable “experience and rich memories” into Polish-Soviet relations, during the time the Katyn 
massacre was brought to the world stage.11  These men, along several others not mentioned here, 
furnished Zawodny’s examination with a personal point of view, thus lending credibility to many 
of his conclusions.   
There is also two key aspects to Zawodny’s book that differentiates his publication from 
that of Mackiewicz’s.  First, Zawodny had personally conducted 150 interviews with officers and 
soldiers of the 2nd Polish Corps, 8th British Army, who were all former Soviet prisoners of war and 
interned at camp Kozelsk (most of the corpses recovered at Katyn came from this camp), but were 
subsequently transferred to camp Grazovec, sparring them the fate that had befallen their 
comrades.  Even so, these men “confirmed” that the number of diaries the Germans and others 
found on the victims remains at Katyn, were “written by the hands of their friends with whom they 
were imprisoned,” and as Zawodny points out, “all [of those] diaries end in April 1940.”12  This 
                                                          
9 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. vii.  
10 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. viii.   
11 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. viii. 
12 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. 89.  
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and other accounts of camp conditions, as well as NKVD (see footnote below) attempts to 
indoctrinate Polish prisoners into communist ideology, became a chilling, but insightful, part of 
Zawodny’s work.13  It also supplied him with enough evidence to conclude that the NKVD was 
responsible for the deaths of the Polish officers.  Secondly, Zawodny scrutinizes the positions that 
the United States and British Governments embraced in regards to the Katyn massacre.  While he 
determines that both Churchill and Roosevelt “believed victory” over the Germans was more 
important than to be preoccupied with the Katyn tragedy, Zawodny does raise one significant 
question: “why after the cessation of hostilities in Europe [was] the Katyn affair still suppressed 
by governmental officials in the United States?”14  However, Zawodny’s answer to that question 
doesn’t implicate anyone in the Truman administration, nor Truman himself, who may have had 
reasons for continuing to suppress the knowledge of this event from the American people.   
Similar to that of Zawodny’s book, the 1965 publication The Crime of Katyn: Facts & 
Documents, written by a team of several scholars working under a single editor—Zdzislaw Stahl—
utilizes an extensive range of Polish, German, Soviet, and U.S. sources and documents in its 
narration of the Katyn crime.  Although this work was originally published in 1948, and both an 
English and Polish version were “prepared simultaneously,” only the Polish edition was published.  
And unfortunately, the 1948 edition was not widely circulated, nor was it available to American 
or Polish audiences, therefore, only Britons fluent in the Polish language or ethnic Poles living in 
Great Britain were able to comprehend its contents.15  One could theorize that British-Soviet 
relations, political tensions, and the beginnings of the Cold War, no doubt played a role in the 
                                                          
13 The NKVD stands for The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. In essence, this organization was the secret 
police force of the Soviet Union before, during, and shortly after WWII, and would eventually become the precursor 
to the KGB.  See Louis FitzGibbon, Katyn Massacre: A Crime Without Parallel. Torrance, Calif: Noontide Press, 
1971. 31. 
14 Zawodny. Death in the Forest. 185, 101-24. 
15 Zdzislaw Stahl, ed. The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents. Polish Cultural Foundation, 1965. v. 
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semi-suppression of this work from British audiences in 1948.  Regardless, while exact reasons 
are unclear, according to General Wladyslaw Anders, who authored the foreword to the 1965 
edition, the English version was finally realized after “the Polish Cultural Foundation made it 
possible”—which also happened to correspond with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the crime.16  
Thus, at long last, the reports regarding the Katyn massacre became available to British and 
American readers by 1965.  In addition, the release of the 1965 publication did benefit from one 
particular source which was not included in the 1948 version: The United States’ 1951-1952 
Congressional Hearings on the Katyn tragedy.  
While The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents is a book that methodically dissects the 
evidence surrounding the massacre, perhaps the most unique aspect of this work is Wladyslaw 
Anders’ personal involvement in the project.  Anders was captured by the Red Army in 1939 near 
the city of Lwow (now Lviv), but he was eventually released after Hitler ordered operation 
Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union—and after the Polish-Soviet Treaty was signed in 
1941.  Under the terms of the Polish-Soviet agreement, Stalin granted “amnesty” to all Polish 
citizens, Polish prisoners of war, and Polish political detainees that were taken during the Soviet 
invasion of Poland in 1939.17  Following Anders’ release from prison, he became the Commander-
in-Chief of all Polish forces in Russia.  Consequently, Anders was tasked with organizing and 
uniting Polish armed forces into a cohesive army to fight against the Nazi war machine.  As a 
result, “finding…many thousands of Polish [officers],” became the goal of his many endeavors in 
creating such an army.18  Anders’ telling of his struggles with locating the whereabouts of these 
individuals for nearly two years, as well as his repeated conversations and interactions with 
                                                          
16 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. v. 
17 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. 76.  
18 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. vi.  
11 
 
Premier Stalin on the matter, provides an exclusive narrative to this story.  And when the mass 
graves were unearthed in 1943, Anders’ no longer “had any doubts,” that those killed at Katyn, 
“were the very officers…destined for [his] army.”19  Hence, the loss of the “very cream” of Poland 
and its army, provided the reason for his personal involvement in the publication of this book.20 
Another interesting feature to The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents, is that the wide 
variety of records and evidence used in the telling of this story, came directly from Polish civilian 
and military sources that was assembled by the Polish Government-in-exile before, and after this 
governing body learned of the massacre.  This includes Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski’s 
recorded conversations with General Anders, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav 
Molotov, and Premier Stalin, where the issue concerning the missing Polish officers was discussed 
extensively between 1941-1943.  And the added efforts of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who not only 
succeeded Sikorski as Prime Minister of the exiled government in 1943, but endeavored quite 
fervently to uncover the truth of the affair during his tenure, is all thoroughly examined in great 
detail throughout the book.   Also presented are the personal interviews and statements from former 
Polish prisoners of war, and the written testimonies from the family’s victims who had lost all 
contact with their loved ones in the spring of 1940.  Furthermore, the Official German 
Documentary Evidence of the Katyn Case; the report by the International Medical Commission; 
the Soviet’s Official Statement, and even a handful of Soviet eyewitnesses to the crime, are all 
thoroughly discussed and evaluated.  Similar to that of other works previously mentioned, the 
evidence presented in this publication confirm that the Polish officers were executed by the 
                                                          
19 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. vii.  
20 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. viii.  
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NKVD, not the Red Army, in the spring of 1940, and that the British and American governments 
conspired to conceal the truth in order to protect their alliance with the Soviet Union.21  
In contrast to the aforementioned works, the 1971 book, Katyn Massacre: A Crime Without 
Parallel, authored by Louis Fitzgibbon, is perhaps one of the most uninformative versions to the 
Katyn story.  Indeed, in the very beginning of his book, Fitzgibbon declares that his reasonings for 
writing the book is to once and for all “clear…all the obscurity” that has “shrouded” the Katyn 
controversy, and to “remove any doubt as to who is the culprit” behind the Katyn massacre.22  As 
powerful as this statement is, Fitzgibbon’s work offers no new evidence, and his book mostly 
consists of testimonies of former Polish prisoners of war and other documents—all of which, was 
already exhaustively examined in previous works.  However, the book is well written, and the list 
of illustrations of the grave sites provides a more emotional feeling to the story of Katyn.  Oddly 
enough, this tale was also republished in 1979, but other than adding an extensive preface, no other 
part of this publication varies from that of the original version.  Nonetheless, Fitzgibbon does 
affirm that the sales from his book will provide financial assistance to the families of the victims 
of the murdered men, and in time, also help fund a memorial in honor of the Polish officers.23  
With this in mind, perhaps one could assume that this work was designed to keep the story of 
Katyn alive, so that the families of the murdered Polish officers may one day live at peace knowing 
that the memory of their loved ones, and what happened at katyn, will never be forgotten.      
By 1980, a young Polish American graduate student named Robert Szymczak (who would 
later become a professor of American History and Politics at Penn State University) wrote his 
                                                          
21 Stahl, Zdzislaw. The Crime of Katyn. 76-97, 114, 126-32, 139. 
22 FitzGibbon, Louis, Katyn Massacre: A Crime Without Parallel. Np.  
23 FitzGibbon, Louis, Katyn Massacre: A Crime Without Parallel. 5-14.  
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Ph.D. dissertation on the Katyn massacre.  Under its title, The Unquiet Dead: The Katyn Forest 
Massacre as an Issue in American Policy, Szymczak’s dissertation would become just that—the 
Katyn affair seen through the lens of American foreign policy.  Unlike others before him, 
Szymczak’s thesis concentrates on the how and the why, for a brief period of time, the Katyn 
controversy came to the forefront of American politics in the early 1950s.  Therefore, his discourse 
centers around the Congressional investigation of the Katyn Forest Massacre that was conducted 
in 1951-1952—just as the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
began to dominate the political landscape of U.S. foreign policy.  While other books previously 
mentioned have also included the House Select Committee’s special report in their investigations, 
Szymczak argues that the Katyn affair and the timing of the Congressional report, coincided with 
America’s “fear” that the Soviet Union and communist expansion was a serious threat to Western 
societies.   
In addition, Szymczak contends that the United States’ anxieties over communist 
expansionism had intertwined with the important Presidential election cycle of 1952.  Indeed, 
Szymczak writes that the Katyn investigation became a driving force for Republicans to steer the 
“ethnic vote,” away from “traditionally Democratic Eastern European[s]” to the Republican side 
of the aisle.24  However, he also reasons that the House investigation into the Katyn massacre did 
not capture the interest of Congress and the American people based solely on the fear of 
communism or the procuring of votes.  Senator McCarthy’s “witch hunts” for communist 
sympathizers within the State Department, the fall of China to Mao Zedong and his communist 
forces, and of course, the Korean War, all led to United States’ “revival” of the Katyn crime.25 
                                                          
24 Robert Szymczak. “The Unquiet Dead: The Katyn Forest Massacre as an Issue in American Policy.” ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing, 1980. 6, 284.  
25 Szymczak, Robert. The Unquiet Dead. 283.  
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According to Szymczak, the latter was “extremely important” to the Congressional investigations 
into the Katyn crime, particularly since the reported brutalities being committed against American 
soldiers serving in Korea, “bore a remarkable resemblance to the method[s]” the Soviets used 
against the Polish officers nearly a decade earlier.26   
In short, Szymczak’s dissertation is an excellent case study of the Polish tragedy, which 
ultimately turned into a very political, highly-publicized, Cold War issue within the United States.  
In truth, his study is the first to look at Katyn from an American perspective.  He investigates the 
rather large role that the American press played in exposing this tragedy for political purposes, and 
how the powerful Polish American Congress (PAC) began ramping up their voices and criticisms 
of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations that spent nearly a decade concealing the affair from 
the American people.  All in all, Szymczak’s manuscript is a must read for anyone interested in 
examining how politics will always undermine actual truths and actual justice.27 
In 1991 former Associated Press journalist and political speech writer, Allen Paul, would 
author one of the most widely acclaimed publications on the Katyn Massacre.  Paul’s book, Katyn: 
The Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, along parallel lines to that of Szymczak’s 
manuscript, hinges heavily on the findings of the 1951-1952 House Select Committee’s report on 
Katyn.  Paul utilizes the Congressional report to trace the Katyn affair from the very beginnings 
of the signing of Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact; to the formation of the Polish Government-in-
exile in London; to the Polish-Soviet Treaty; to the discovery of the murdered Polish officers; to 
the Allied whitewash of the crime, and finally, to its decade’s worth of embittered consequences.  
He also uses a wide array of unpublished Polish documents, together with books and interviews to 
support his overall interpretations and conclusions.  In addition, Paul incorporates the recent 
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revelations concerning the Katyn massacre by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev.  In April of 
1990, Gorbachev, for the first time in nearly forty-seven years, “publicly acknowledged…his 
nation’s guilt” of the Katyn crime.28  Gorbachev’s acknowledgement of Soviet responsibility for 
the extermination of the Polish officers, happened to correspond with his policy of glasnost 
(“openness”), and as a result, this guiding principle limited censorship and encouraged “political 
discussion” into Stalin’s past transgressions.29 
However, the brief introduction of the book written by Allen Paul’s publisher is quite 
deceiving.  To be clear, Paul has not “unearthed the terrible truth” about Katyn—as the book jacket 
suggests.30  The evidence and facts surrounding the Katyn affair has been crystal clear long before 
the release of Paul’s book.  Hence, one should not be lured into this story thinking some new 
revelation concerning the massacre has finally been brought to light.  Nevertheless, there is one 
aspect to his work that is indeed “untold” as the title suggests.  Paul develops a distinctive and 
broader narrative in his account of Katyn by following the stories of three families: “the Hoffmans 
and Pawulskis of Lwow, and the Czarneks of Krakow.”31  In that order, an attorney, a regular army 
officer, a physician, and most importantly, three husbands and fathers, were all victims of the 
Katyn massacre.32  But the hardships that the wives, sons, and daughters had to endure at the hands 
of the Soviets after their loved ones were murdered, by far is the most gripping and emotional tale 
to Paul’s story.  Yet his ability to weave their struggles against the cruelest forms of tyranny and 
oppression throughout the text, also becomes an inspiring testament in their capacity to find 
courage in the face of such difficulties.  
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Nearly twenty-years after Katyn: The Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre was 
published, Allen Paul would reproduce this book in 2010.  Under a new title, Katynʹ: Stalin's 
Massacre and the Triumph of Truth, this edition includes much of same content as his 1991 edition, 
however, Paul includes the efforts and research of historians Anna Cienciala (an American), 
Natalia S. Lebedeva (a Russian), and Wojciech Materski (a Pole), whose 2007 book, Katyn: A 
Crime Without Punishment, provided Paul with Russian translations into some “of the most 
important documents” concerning the Katyn massacre since the collapse of the Soviet Union.33  
Furthermore, Paul adds a single chapter to this edition—“Echoes of O’Malley,”—where he 
analyzes official documents and records (that were declassified in 2009) by the U.S. House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, which was responsible for approving the House Select Committee’s 
recommendations regarding the crime of Katyn.34  However, according to Paul, the Presidential 
and Congressional elections of 1952, not only saw Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican) winning 
the presidential election in a landslide, but Republicans across the country that were competing for 
Congressional seats, would gain control of Congress for the first time since the Great Depression.  
Thus, under Republican leadership, and Eisenhower’s widely popular campaign promise of ending 
the war in Korea, led to the Foreign Affairs Committee rejecting the proposals of the Select 
Committee—since bringing American troops home from Korea required the cooperation and 
support from the Soviet Union.  Hence, “continuing the drumbeat over Katyn” would only further 
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disrupt or distract the Eisenhower administration and Congressional Republicans from achieving 
this goal.35   
In all, Allen Paul’s books on Katyn are well written, researched, and easy to follow.  While 
his inclusion of the personal lives of the three families who lost loved ones at Katyn provides some 
dramatic flair to his telling of the story, his discovery of declassified documents from the 
Congressional Hearings, does shed new light on how politics continued to undermine the work 
and diligence of those that wanted to bring this atrocity to the center stage of international affairs.    
In contrast to all other works mentioned, the 2007 publication Katyn: A Crime Without 
Punishment, provides the most complete collection and exhaustive study into the Soviet archival 
documentation on the Katyn massacre.  However, Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment, could not 
have been possible without the added efforts of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.  In fact, it was 
Yeltsin who permitted the release of these records in October of 1992, which included “the key 
Politburo decision” to execute Polish prisoners of war in March of 1940, along with documentation 
that highlights Soviet endeavors to cover-up their crimes.36  In addition, copies of these documents 
were sent to Polish President Lech Walesa, and in February of 1993, representatives of the Head 
Office of State Archives in Poland and the Federal Archival Agency in Russia came to an 
agreement which “established the principles for the publication of the Katyn documents.”37  In 
total, two versions of these documents were published: a Russian volume in its original texts and 
a Polish version with Polish translations.  The three historians and authors of Katyn: A Crime 
Without Punishment—Anna Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, who were 
briefly mentioned in the above section—wanted to deliver the circumstances regarding the Katyn 
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massacre to English speaking audiences, who for the most part, were not fully aware of this 
historical event.   
Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment is divided into three parts, and each section is 
accompanied by considerable comments and explanations by Anna M. Cienciala.  Aiding 
Cienciala in her research, Natalia S. Lebedeva, of the Institute of General History, Russian 
Academy of Services, Moscow, was chiefly responsible for the Russian side of the story, and 
Wojciech Materski, director of the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy Services, 
Warsaw, was responsible for the Polish side, and both served as co-editors of the American 
volume.  Part one of the book, “Prisoners of an Undeclared War, 23 August 1939-5 March 1940,” 
begins with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, and continues by telling the story 
of war, capture, and Polish life during Soviet imprisonment.38  Part two of the book, 
“Extermination, March-June 1940,” presents documents written by Lavrenty Beria (the head of 
the People’s Commissariat Internal Affairs [NKVD] from 1938-1953), who proposed to the 
Politburo and Stalin for the mass execution of 25,700 Polish officers.39  In addition, multiple Soviet 
records produced in this section list the names and ranks of the victims of Katyn, along with 
railway and train dispatches, schedules, assignments, which in all, lead up to the initial execution 
of the Polish officers.40  The final section of the book, “Katyn and Its Echoes, 1940 to the Present,” 
highlights documentation concerning Polish and Russian responses to the German announcement 
of the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn.  Finally, the third section examines how the Katyn 
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affair was handled by the Allies at Nuremberg, and numerous documents relating to the Soviet 
cover-up of the crime throughout the mid-late twentieth century are also produced.41 
Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment is by far one of the most comprehensive and best 
documented books concerning the Katyn massacre.  Intended for English speaking audiences, this 
book delivers an abundance of footnotes, endnotes, biographical notes, references, photographs, 
and a “Glossary of Organizations and Political Parties,” all of which put the finishing touches on 
this exceptional volume.42  This publication is a must read, and is extremely beneficial for students, 
historians, or scholars alike, who are interested in studying Russia, Stalinism, Communism, 
Poland, WWII, mass murder, and the horrible nature and consequences of extreme ideologies.  On 
a final note, Anna Cienciala observes that documents concerning Stalin’s “motives” in his decision 
to have the Polish officers executed are “still missing,” therefore, the most fundamentally question 
as to “why” the Polish officers were killed in the first place, remains “unresolved.”43  While 
numerous works cited above have generated a host of theories as to why, the lack of exact reasons 
and finite answers concerning the Katyn affair from Stalin’s perspective, continues to shroud this 
historical event in mystery to this day.  
The countless publications written about the Katyn undoubtedly demonstrate that the 
Soviet Union was responsible for killing the Polish officers during the spring of 1940.  The story 
of the crime at Katyn has been methodically researched and well documented over the last seventy 
years.  Yet during the war and postwar periods, the United States government continued to remain 
silent on the issue.  In order to understand the reasons why U.S. governmental officials kept their 
knowledge and details of the Katyn affair confidential from the American public between 1943 
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and 1951, several publications that discuss the United States’ foreign policy directives during this 
period of time must be explored.   
The 1957 publication Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace 
They Sought, delivers an excellent account into the diplomatic history of Anglo-American-Soviet 
relations from the beginnings of their coalition in 1941 to the eve of the Potsdam Conference of 
1945.  The book’s author, Herbert Feis, made use of a great deal of hitherto unpublished State 
Department records, and the personal papers of W. Averell Harriman (who was the American 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943-1946), throughout his examinations.  Also subject to 
Feis’s analysis, is Truman’s personal and official correspondences with Churchill and Stalin during 
the spring of 1945. The magnitude of evidence produced in his book is quite extensive—nearly 
650 pages of primary documents are contained within this volume.  However, Feis’ ability to stick 
to the facts, as they are known, and refrain from alternative points of view or interpretations, is 
also one weakness of his work.   
This becomes particularly relevant in Feis’ scrutiny of the Allied response of Katyn.  
Essentially Feis’ describes the massacre as nothing more than a minor diplomatic annoyance for 
both the United States and Great Britain.  According to Feis, after the Polish Government-in-exile 
had requested the International Red Cross to investigate Katyn in 1943, the American and British 
governments tried to convince Stalin not to break off diplomatic relations with the exiled 
government, after he objected to Polish claims that the Soviet Union was responsible for the 
crime.44  While Feis’ assessment of this event is accurate, (Churchill and Roosevelt mutually 
struggled to persuade Stalin against cutting off diplomatic ties with the Polish Government-in-
exile), there are other reasons why the U.S. and Great Britain responded to Katyn the way they did 
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which Feis fails to mention.  For instance, by 1943, British and American officials—particularly 
Churchill and Roosevelt—were concerned that Stalin might make a separate peace deal with the 
Germans if their governments don’t increase their efforts in the fight against the Nazis.  And for 
the United States specifically, they wanted Soviet assistance in fighting the Japanese in the Pacific 
after the Germans were defeated.45  Therefore, there were broader implications as to why the West 
responded to the massacre that Feis fails to illuminate.  Nonetheless, while his failures to explain 
the events outside the United States’ diplomatic scope that resulted in their reaction to Katyn, his 
book is an exceptional study into the diplomatic history of the three great powers during WWII.     
Along similar lines to that of Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the 
Peace They Sought, the 1958 publication, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, 
authored by Edward J. Rozek, also provides the diplomatic history of Anglo-American-Soviet 
relations during WWII.  However, Rozek examines these relationships from the Polish perspective.  
Thus, his book is a thorough analysis of Soviet actions concerning Poland between 1939 and 1945, 
and how the Polish Government-in-exile fought tirelessly with the British, American, and Soviet 
governments for a free and independent Poland throughout the war.   In his evaluation of the 
diplomatic events, Rozek utilizes official documents and records from the Polish Government-in-
exile, and the personal files from Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, all of which, delivers a 
powerful image of real war-time negotiations among Polish leaders, Ambassadors, Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and Stalin.  While Rozek quotes heavily from primary sources throughout the text, his 
publication is mostly devoted to the issue of Poland’s pre-war eastern boundaries, and the means 
in which the British and American governments were willing to concede those territories to the 
Soviets by wars’ end.  
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 Although the Katyn massacre is discussed in various sections throughout his book, 
Rozek’s analysis of the Allied response to Katyn fails to mention other circumstances that 
influenced their reaction.  Rozek reasons, that regardless of who, at the time was believed to be 
responsible for the crime (the Germans or the Soviets), the “appearance of Allied unity” was more 
important to the defeat of Hitler and his Nazi regime for the United States and Great Britain.46  
Therefore, the alliance between the “Big Three” outweighed all other issues, including Katyn.  
This may be a rather simplistic argument for the Allied response to Katyn, and no doubt historically 
accurate, but like the aforementioned book, Rozek neglects to highlight other factors that affected 
the Western response to the murder of the Polish officers.  However, Rozek’s book provides 
immense insight into the internal struggles, and at times, the frequent heated exchanges that took 
place between the British, American, and Polish Governments whenever the question of Poland, 
its sovereignty, or Polish fears of a communist takeover were discussed. 
All told thus far, the sources listed above deliver an intriguing account into the political, 
economic, and social conditions which guided the foreign policy initiatives of the United States 
against the Soviet Union throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  They also provide possible motives in 
the suppression of the Katyn affair from the American people and other European nations while 
President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph 
Stalin, allied their governments in the fight against fascism.  Yet, after Roosevelt’s death in 1945, 
over the course of President Harry Truman’s first term in office (albeit not a full term), and halfway 
into his second, the information surrounding the massacre was still being withheld from the 
American public at large.  This is rather strange when considering those within the Truman 
administration, and he himself, designed and developed hardened policies against the spread of 
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communism both home and abroad throughout his tenure in office.  Would it not have been more 
prudent for the Truman administration to highlight the Katyn atrocity, especially after it was clear 
by 1946 that the U.S.-Soviet alliance was deteriorating, and that the principles of Western 
democracies were not palatable to that of the Soviet Union’s?  Would it not strengthen the 
administration’s argument that the ideology of communism was a serious threat to those values?  
Or did American leaders simply have to make rapid decisions in a very fluid environment?  That 
is, did the circumstances of the massacre have to fade into the shadows of public opinion and 
international law, as much larger events forced policy makers to react decisively, but cautiously, 
in an age of atomic power?  As for the role in which President Roosevelt played in suppressing the 
crime, perhaps his actions may have been an embarrassment to those that admired him the most.  
Hence, did policy makers decide to withhold their knowledge of Soviet culpability for the massacre 
in order to protect Roosevelt’s legacy?            
While the answers to the above questions ultimately becomes the subject of this paper, a 
more general understanding of Poland’s historical position spanning several centuries in Europe 
must be explored in some slight detail.  In addition, a further examination of the foreign policy 
objectives of the U.S. during the Cold War against the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1951, will 
also be considered in order to grasp the political environment which led to a Congressional 
Hearing’s regarding the crime at Katyn in 1951.  
 
 
The Commonwealth of Poland 
Poland’s history in Europe throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries 
is truly one of a kind.  Indeed, at the height of its power by the early-1600s, the Polish-Lithuanian 
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Commonwealth was considered one of the greater powers of Europe.  Its territory was vast, 
extending from the Baltic Sea in the north almost to the Black Sea in south, and comprised of 
nearly 400,000 square miles of land between the Prussian, Austrian, Hungarian, Ottoman, and 
Russian territories.47  While the Commonwealth saw some fifteen-million people inhabiting its 
land, Poland at this time was by no means a homogenous state.  In fact, nearly two-thirds of its 
citizens consisted of groups from either Eastern Slavic or German descents.  In addition, the 
northeastern part of Commonwealth, the province of Lithuania, was populated by people 
(Lithuanians) who shared a distinct culture and language that was separate from that of the Poles.  
But the Commonwealth was unlike the other autocratic states of Europe.  Not only did Poland 
suffer greatly from numerous military conflicts with Sweden and the Muscovite (Russian) empires 
during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—which in the end proved disastrous 
and weakened Poland both militarily and economically—the Commonwealth’s true downfall was 
the result of its rather inept political structure that came into being by the turn of the early 1600s. 
When Sigismund II Augustus, the last king of the Jagiellonian line, died in 1572, the 
nobility of the Commonwealth assumed the role of electing its future kings.  An assembly of 
nobles, more commonly referred to as a Diet or Sejm, became the main governing body of Poland.  
However, while other autocratic states during this time “strengthened and centralized” the powers 
of the king or emperor, which created “consistency and stability to the state” against the cruelty 
and abuses of feudal lords against lower gentry and peasantry classes, the opposite was true of 
Poland.48  The Commonwealth Diet consisted of wealthy landowners of noble rank who only 
succeeded in strengthening their own powers and control at the expense of the Polish state.  In fact, 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Diet reduced the powers of the king so 
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much so, that essentially the king of Poland was a ceremonial figurehead, whose exercise of 
powers came on orders and direction of the Polish nobility, not the king himself.  Furthermore, 
unique to the Commonwealth’s Diet was the leberum veto.  This meant that any single 
representative of the Diet could “veto [any] decision,” even if it was “approved by a majority” of 
nobles.49  As a consequence of this rather dysfunctional political body, a system of payoffs and 
coercion in order to obtain a noble’s vote became a common feature of the Polish Diet.  
Furthermore, elections for the Polish crown often resulted in princes from other nations using 
“bribery, force, or threats of force” to secure the election of a candidate of their choice.50  In short, 
this corrupt and diluted process of electing its future kings left the Commonwealth vulnerable to 
foreign influence, and this is precisely what happened in the events leading up to the first partition 
of Poland by 1772 by the Russian Empress, Catherine the Great. 
 
The Partitions of Poland 
Catherine II’s role in the three partitions of the Polish Commonwealth between 1772 and 
1795, was a brilliant act of cunning on her part.  Her master stroke of foreign collusion against 
Poland began when the Polish King Augustus III died in 1763.  With the Polish throne vacant, the 
Russian Empress wanted a monarch in Warsaw who would not intervene in her plans for war 
against the Ottoman Turks.  Catherine therefore favored the candidacy of a native Pole to sit on 
the Commonwealth throne—actually, she already decided on who that man should be: Stanislaw 
Poniatowski, her former lover.   Stanislaw Poniatowski belonged “to one of the greatest Polish 
families,” and Catherine knew that she could count on his support during her foreign exploits.51  
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Prussia, Poland’s northwestern neighbor, also supported Poniatowski’s ascension to the Polish 
throne—especially since it meant keeping out an Austrian candidate.  Austria on the other hand, 
Poland’s southwestern neighbor, may have preferred a member of the Saxon ruling house to sit on 
the throne, but their previous conflicts with the Turks meant they were willing to support 
Poniatowski since they were aware of Catherine’s plans to wage war on the Ottoman Empire.  This 
Catherine knew, and with the support from the other Central European powers, the empress bribed 
and intimidated the Polish nobility into electing Poniatowski as the next king of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in August 1764.52  But several years later, when Catherine “embarked 
on a campaign to abolish religious discrimination” in Poland—which at the time was dominated 
by Roman Catholicism, having only small minorities in Orthodox, Lutheran, and Jewish faiths—
factional differences in Poland against these reforms led to civil war in the Commonwealth by 
1768.53 
After a succession of violent protest against Catherine’s religious reforms, a group of 
conservative Polish magnates formed a “Confederation” in the Polish town of Bar (located in the 
southern region of modern day Ukraine).  The Confederation quickly gained allies, including 
Catholic dominated France, and the Ottoman Empire.  But while the Turks supported the 
Confederation under the guise of protecting “Polish liberties,” their support was merely a pretext 
to declare war against their longtime rival Russia.54  Regardless, both Austria and Prussia stayed 
out of the conflict, forcing the Russian Empress to fight the war alone.  Nevertheless, with two 
large armies at Catherine’s disposal, and after four years of fighting, the Russians finally defeated 
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the Confederation in 1772.  Yet, in order to reassure the Austrians and Prussians that she had no 
major territorial ambitions in eastern Europe, thereby threating their sovereignty, Catherine 
decided to “spread the wealth” of her victory over Poland.  The empress arranged for a three-power 
agreement between Prussia, Austria and Russia, which “marked the first stage of the destruction 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.”55  Over thirty percent of the Commonwealth’s 
territories, and nearly one-third of its population, was partitioned among the three states, with lands 
in the west going to Prussia, lands in the southwest going to Austria, and lands in the east going to 
Russia.56 
Ironically over the next twenty years, Poland underwent a remarkable recovery, seeing 
widespread changes in its economy and educational systems.  And a new liberal constitution was 
adopted by the Commonwealth Diet in 1791.  Under the new constitution (also known as the “May 
3 Act of Reform”) new laws were enacted to strengthen the Polish monarchy and Diet, with the 
intention of ridding Poland of foreign influence.57  In short, the monarchy of Poland was to become 
hereditary, not elected.  Moreover, the king was to be given greater executive authority and power 
over foreign and military affairs.  The Polish Diet would also be converted into a two-chamber 
body, with the lower body being the superior and most dominate of the two.  Increased 
representation from the middle-classes as well would be included, and the “dysfunctional” leberum 
veto was abolished, favoring the concept of majority rule instead.58  However, the Act of Reform 
sparked a conservative (wealthy nobles who supported Russian influence) rebellion in Poland, 
which once again left Poland vulnerable to foreign intervention.  In 1792, on Catherine’s orders, 
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troops from Russia entered Poland, and joined her partisan forces.  Shortly thereafter, Prussia 
entered the conflict.  Although the Poles put up a heroic defense under the command of General 
Tadeusz Kosciusko, who was the leader of the Polish nationalists in the fight against the invasion, 
the superior numbers of the Russian and Prussian armies meant the situation was essentially 
hopeless for the Poles, and they could not prevent another partition.  Thus, after Kosciusko’s 
insurrection failed, the second partition of the Commonwealth occurred in 1793, which ceded 
further Polish lands in the east to Russia, and in the west to Prussia (Austria being the only power 
of three that did not participate in the affair).59 
In spite of the second partition, General Kosciusko once again formed and led another 
nationalist uprising against the partitioning powers a year later, but after some initial success, the 
Poles were ultimately defeated.  As a result of the insurrectionists’ failures to regain Polish 
independence, the third partition of Poland divided the remainder of Polish territories between 
Prussia, Austria, and Russia, which brought about the “end of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth,” and effectively erased Poland from the map of Europe.60  Over the next 123 
years, Poland existed as a partitioned land.  While the national uprisings in 1830 and 1863 
attempted to liberate Poles from the arbitrary rule of the partitioning powers, the young Polish 
officers, students, and so forth, who took part in these uprisings, were unable to rally enough 
support among Polish serfs and average peasants to be victorious (the political and civil rights of 
the peasants were rarely discussed during these uprisings).61  Ultimately the partitions of Polish 
lands left a lasting and embittered legacy.  But the efforts by the Prussians to destroy the Polish 
language and establish “high-quality compulsory” schools in the German language, by no means 
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prevented future generations of Poles from learning their own language.62  Furthermore, in areas 
controlled by the Austrians, censorship was least oppressive.  Polish villages and villagers in 
Austria were permitted to publish books and newspapers in the Polish language, and were even 
allowed to practice their own religion.  But the partitions had negative consequences as well.  
Several Ukrainian historians have argued that oppression of Polish serfs and Polish commoners by 
Polish nobles actually increased under Russian occupation since Russian authorities asserted law 
and order more aggressively than their Polish counter-parts.63  Consequently, the Russian Empire, 
in many ways, was responsible for the growth of anti-Russian sentiments in these areas, and the 
“hostility” and efforts at the Russification of Polish elites, Jews, and other groups throughout the 
Russian controlled regions of the Poland, also contributed to anti-Russian nationalism.64  In 
fairness to Russia however, Poland (also referred to as the Kingdom of Poland or Congress Poland 
after the Congress of Vienna) after its third partition, was allowed to have its own “legislature, 
army, currency, school system, and administration,” all while allowed to conduct official business 
using the Polish language.65  In short, the Kingdom of Poland was essentially a constitutional 
monarchy, with the Russian emperor or empress acting as its king, and it was only after the national 
uprisings of 1830 that Tsar Nicolas I (reigned 1825-55) ultimately began dismembering some of 
these practices and institutions.  
 
The Reemergence of a Polish State 
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By the early twentieth century, Poland would regain its independence after the great powers 
of Europe engaged one another in one of the bloodiest conflicts in world history.  Between 1914 
and 1918, millions of civilians and soldiers alike were killed or wounded as a result of the First 
Great War.  As the powers of the France, Great Britain, and Russia (Triple Entente or Allies), were 
pitted against the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires (Central Powers) in an epic 
struggle, the weakened military position of the Central Powers by 1917, combined with the United 
States’ entry into the war in April of that same year, eventually led to an Allied victory.  After 
suffering four and half grueling years of trench warfare, World War I officially came to an end on 
November 11, 1918.  It was on this day in a railroad car in the Compiegne Forest in which an 
armistice was signed between the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany.  While the 
victors of the war established the terms for Germany’s unconditional surrender, it also signaled to 
the rest of the world that the remaining vestiges of the old empires of Europe had completely 
withered away.  The Russian Empire ceased to exist as well, after the Russian Revolution of 1917 
effectively ended over three hundred years of Imperial rule, and destroyed any remnants of the 
tsarist regime in its wake.  The Allies imposed upon the Central Powers a series of peace treaties 
(the Treaty of Versailles being the most notable among these), which did more than demand 
economic reparations from the now toppled autocracies of Europe.  These treaties also called for 
the near dismantling, and in some instances, complete abolishment of the military organizations 
and institutions of the Central Powers.  Without military hegemony, the Central Powers lost 
political control over areas which were inhabited by national groups who shared strong ethnic and 
cultural identity.  As a result, national leaders in these areas, who “claimed to represent the will of 
a given national group,” appealed to the Allies for independence and full autonomy, more 
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specifically, they claimed the right of self-determination under the guidelines of President 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.66 
It is along these lines that the Allies approved the break-up and formation of new states 
among the territories of the now collapsed empires of Europe, and the map of Eastern Europe was 
completely transformed by the end of 1919.  The new states that emerged shared a distinct 
historical connection to the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires.  These Successor 
States, as they are more commonly referred to as, Poland surfaced as the greatest among these.  
For little over a century, several historians argue that “the Polish question…had been the subject 
of international agreements and disagreements in equal measure.”67  The collapse of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth in the late eighteenth century attracted the attention of numerous 
enlightenment thinkers throughout Europe to the Polish cause of independence and self-
government.  Thus, as other Western societies spread the ideas of tolerance, progress, 
individualism, nationalism, and constitutional government, this made it difficult for those same 
nations “to deny that the Poles had a right to independence.”68  And so, as numerous Polish elites 
fought bitterly against the auspices of the partitioning powers throughout the nineteenth century, 
the reemergence of the Polish state by the end of WWI was indeed a historic turnaround to this 
great “international injustice,” and it became a “touchstone” of postwar “European morality.”69  
But it can hardly be said that tensions between the former partitioning powers and Poland 
was completely eradicated as a result of Poland’s revival.  The scars ran too deep for many Poles. 
And while the specter of the Great War was behind the whole of Europe, new conflicts over the 
                                                          
66 Prazmowska, Anita. Poland: A Modern History. 1. 
67 Prazmowska, Anita. Poland: A Modern History. 1. 
68 Prazmowska, Anita. Poland: A Modern History. 1-2.  
69 Prazmowska, Anita. Poland: A Modern History. 1-2. 
32 
 
Eastern frontiers of Poland would materialize as the newly created Polish state would once again 
find itself pitted against its old adversary in the 1920s.  
 
The Russians Again 
Tensions between Poland and the future Soviet state began at the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919.  Though the Allies were responsible for reconstituting new states out of the wreckage of 
the old German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires at the Paris accords, defining the 
borders of these newly established states became a constant thorn in the Allies side.  The needs of 
different national groups in various areas, proved to be irreconcilable.70  But as Russia became 
engulfed in civil war while the Paris Peace talks were officially underway—which saw anti-
Bolshevik (the Whites) Russians attempting to overthrow Lenin’s Bolshevik Party (the Reds) from 
power—a strong, not just independent Poland, became necessary for the Allies long-term foreign 
policy initiatives.   
Indeed, an economically and militarily strong Poland would make a powerful partner in 
Central Europe, moreover, it could serve as a buffer between the Germans in the West and the 
Reds in the East.  Then again, neither the British nor U.S. governments were willing to accept 
Poland’s excessive territorial demands. The Polish National Government along with the Polish 
delegation at the Peace Conference, ultimately rejected the Allied proposals concerning Poland’s 
borders.  Those proposals, issued by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in December 1919, 
suggested that a line should be drawn, starting in the northwestern most corner of East Prussia, to 
the edge of Galicia’s most eastern corner in the south, whereby Eastern Europe would be divided 
around cultural demographics—in short, ethnic Poles would live west of the line, while other 
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Slavic people would live east of the line.  However by 1920, Polish demands for further territorial 
gains—particularly in east Prussia with its foremost port city of Danzig—combined with the Red 
Army’s virtual defeat of General Anton Denikin’s White (anti-Bolsheviks) Army by early 
November 1919 in Soviet Russia, witnessed the Polish National Government (encouraged by the 
French government) launching an attack on the Soviet state in April that same year.71   
Under the command of Josef Pilsudski (General and Head of State of Poland), the Polish 
Army achieved early successes against the Ukrainians in East Galicia, but the Polish offensive 
quickly lost momentum, and Polish forces in the east fell to the superior might of the Red Army.  
Indeed, by the mid-summer of 1920, the Red Army had pushed so deep within the Polish territory, 
that for a time, it appeared that Poland might be “bolshevized at the point of a Russian bayonet.”72  
Meanwhile, Poles in Warsaw reached out to the Allied governments for assistance, yet, upon the 
condition of mediation between the Poles and the Soviet state (a government in which neither the 
British of French governments officially recognized), the Polish Government had to accept the 
withdrawal of its forces to the boundaries that the Allies suggested back in December 1919.  That 
demarcation line, more famously known as the Curzon Line (the brain child of British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon), was dispatched to the Soviets in July 1920.  But the Soviets (actually 
Lenin) rejected that offer, mainly on grounds that any negotiated peace settlement should take 
place between officials from Poland and Soviet Russia directly, without interference from the other 
European powers.  Meanwhile, the Red Army continued their advance towards Warsaw.  Yet over 
the course of several weeks, the Polish army successfully defended the city against the Soviets, 
and launched a counter-offensive against the Red Army in Eastern Poland.  The Soviets, who by 
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this time were completely exhausted after three years of revolution, civil war, famine, and 
economic disorder, finally agreed to a negotiated peace with the Poles during the winter of 1921.  
The Treaty of Riga was signed in March of 1921 between Soviet and Polish authorities, which 
ultimately established the eastern borders of Poland—and actually extended Polish lands beyond 
that of Lord Curzon’s proposed demarcation line.  In addition, Poland’s eastern frontiers 
established at Riga were officially recognized on March 15, 1923, by the Allied Powers in 
accordance with Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, which “authorized these Powers to fix 
Poland’s eastern boundaries,” and three weeks later, the United States formally accepted the 
conditions put forth by the Riga Treaty.73 
Although Poland by 1922 was an independent state with well-defined and agreed upon 
borders, the political and economic situation in Poland was far from harmonious.  After Poland 
created a democratic constitution that same year, the subsequent national elections saw Pilsudski 
transferring his powers to the newly elected president Gabriel Narutowicz in December 1922.  But 
Narutowicz’s assassination just several days later by radical elements of the right-wing National 
Democratic Party of Poland (ND), united various peasant parties and other left-wing groups around 
the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which in the end, saw Stanislaw Wojciechowski, a friend and 
colleague of Pilsudski, becoming the next Polish president.  As for Pilsudski, he grew tired of 
politics, and decided to retire the following year.  By 1925 however, economic and political 
instability continued its strangled hold over the nation.  Dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of the 
parliamentary system, in addition to the Polish Government’s overall ineptness to defend the 
national interest of Poland in general, combined with Poland’s poor economic conditions, 
Pilsudski decided to emerge from retirement, and staged a coup against Wojciechowski’s 
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government in May 1926.  Supported by the Polish armed forces, Pilsudski marched on Warsaw 
and forced Wojciechowski to resign within a few days.  Even though the Polish parliament elected 
Pilsudski as President, he refused the honor, and instead appointed another one of his old 
confidants, Ignacy Moscicki, as president and Head of State of Poland.   Pilsudski on the other 
hand, did assume total control over the Polish Ministry of Defense, and over the next nine years, 
he used his power and influence to guide the direction of the nation’s foreign and domestic 
policies.74 
 
The Rise of Totalitarian Regimes 
Poland eventually began to stabilize its economy and government after the events 
highlighted above, but with the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany, and communism in the Soviet 
Union between the 1920s-30s, Poland, for the fourth time, experienced its final partition by way 
of foreign collusion.  After Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party assumed power, their hostility towards 
the Treaty of Versailles, as well as their bitterness against the loss of Germany’s former territories 
to the Polish state, was well-known.  Forming the core of Hitler’s ideology, was the idea that 
humanity’s constant struggles has always been between “races…or communities of blood.”75  
Hitler therefore was determined to achieve a long-term goal of “race and space,” or Lebensraum 
for the German people.  Under Nazism, Lebensraum suggests that any race that “was not 
expanding…was doomed to disappear,” and according to Hitler, if the German race was going to 
expand, then “living space” was needed to for a “new generation of soldiers and mothers.” 76 Of 
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course, these “new generations of soldiers and mothers” would become Hitler’s idealistic “master 
race,” who are the most pure and unpolluted elements of the German people.77  Along these lines 
Hitler looked to the east to expand the German empire, and the territories of Poland and the Soviet 
Union were particularly enticing.  These areas contained Slavic people—Poles, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Czechs, and so forth—who by and large, were considered by Hitler as a “prime threat” 
against the “survival and dominance” of his Thousand-Year Reich.78  Furthermore, the large 
Jewish populations which also inhabited these regions, likewise fell prey to Hitler’s racial 
theories—because it was the Jewish people who have long endeavored to “infiltrate, weaken, and 
destroy” the German race.79 
But as Hitler began disregarding the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
prohibited the Germans from reconstituting a large military force, and when he later ordered troops 
into the demilitarized area of the Rhineland (west German territory, and became a demilitarized 
zone after the Versailles Treaty) in 1936, European leaders remained somewhat oblivious to 
Hitler’s actual intentions.  Even when Hitler completed the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria in 
1938, and agreed to the Munich accords that same year (Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy 
permitted the annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia to the Germans), neither 
the British or French governments considered these actions by Hitler as hostile takeovers.  In their 
eyes, these exploits by Hitler were merely attempts to reincorporate ethnic Germans back into 
greater Germany.  However in March the following year, Hitler would annex all of 
Czechoslovakia.   Consequently, the French, British, and Polish Governments now believed Hitler 
and his Nazi regime were not only determined to restore glory to the German empire, but also that 
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another world war was drawing nearer.  Yet in order to unleash the Nazi war machine on Poland, 
Hitler needed one European power in particular to remain neutral in the forthcoming conflict: the 
Soviet Union.80   
In 1928, Joseph Stalin, leader of the Communist Party, successfully consolidated his 
power, and eliminated his political rivals by any means necessary—exile, assassination, and 
imprisonment.  Having strengthened his power base, Stalin prepared to initiate his objectives of 
collectivizing and industrializing the Soviet economy.  Known as First Five-Year Plan, Stalin 
embarked on a campaign to highly centralize the Soviet economy.  Stalin reasoned, that in order 
to “foster rapid development” of the economy, then the Soviet Union must invest heavily in 
industry, all while extracting every ruble of profit from agriculture—the backbone and traditional 
foundation of the Russian economy.81  Thus, under Stalin’s collectivization plan, private 
ownership of land, livestock, and even farming equipment, would be eliminated, and agricultural 
production would take place on “large cooperative units” (kolkhozy), whose members shared 
whatever profit remained after making mandatory payments to the Soviet state—in sum, every 
farm, along with its equipment and domestic animals, would belong to the state.82  Stalin reasoned 
that the massive transfer of wealth and resources from farms to the industrialized cities, “could 
double or even triple” industrial production over the course of the First Five-Year Plan.83  But this 
rather “draconian system of tax collections” and “compulsory deliveries” to the Soviet state, saw 
Stalin employing extreme and “indiscriminate brutality” upon millions of his own people.84  
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Indeed, wealthy peasants, such as the kulaks, would virtually cease to exist as a class all by itself 
over the next ten years.  The effectiveness of the First Five-Year Plan greatly improved Soviet 
industry and helped modernize the nation by 1934, but this came at a great expense to the Russian 
people.   As the death toll among Russian peasants continued to rise (either from starvation, 
murder, or living under the harsh conditions of gulags or other forced labor camps), the Soviet 
dictator responded to these events by declaring that he uncovered a vast conspiracy by foreign 
agents to revive capitalism in Soviet Russia.  And when the young and rather energetic party chief 
of Leningrad (formally Petrograd), Sergei Kirov, was assassinated in 1934, Stalin decided that a 
“Great Purge” of “Old Bolsheviks” from within the Communist Party was of the upmost 
importance.85   
Most of the victims during Stalin’s purges, that began in January of 1935, were “loosely 
identified” as conspirators of large movement by party officials to resurrect capitalism in the Soviet 
Union.86  Conversely, Kirov’s assassination served as a pretext for Stalin in order to eliminate 
“Lenin’s original circle of revolutionary leaders,” thereby ensuring that any challenge to his 
control over the Communist Party and the Soviet state went unopposed.87  Ultimately Stalin’s 
cleansing of the Communist Party came about in two phases, the first of which saw membership 
to the party decreasing by nearly 25%, as harsh reprisals, numerous arrests, summary executions, 
and mass deportations of thousands of party administrators were carried out over two year period.  
Stalin’s second phase of purges occurred between 1936 and 1938, and was highlighted by a series 
of “show trials,” whereby top-ranking party leaders were placed on trial and forced into making 
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outlandish “confessions” about their crimes against the Soviet state and the Communist Party.88  
But perhaps the most serious consequences of the Great Purges was the elimination of high-
ranking military officials.  Three out of five Soviet Field Marshals (the highest-rank among 
generals), fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, the entire Soviet admiralty (eight in total), and 
sixty of the sixty-seven corps commanders, and many more, were executed on Stalin’s orders.89  
While Stalin stood alone as the top communist and Soviet leader by 1938, in the West, Adolf 
Hitler’s territorial ambitions, combined with the Nazi’s overall strong sense of nationalism, 
militarism, and anti-Communist, anti-Soviet rhetoric, meant that the Soviet Union was not just a 
target under Nazi ideology, but Stalin’s purges meant that the Soviets were totally unprepared for 
war.  Furthermore, although Stalin’s collectivization plan initially saw industrial production 
increasing drastically over the First Five-Year Plan, and gained in strength by the Second Five-
Year Plan by the late 1930s, Soviet industrialization nonetheless simply couldn’t match that of 
Germany’s.  In addition, Stalin’s liquidation of the officer corps left the Soviet armed forces 
virtually leaderless, and the Red Army in general severely lacked in the necessary weapons and 
vehicles to engage in open warfare.  Therefore, Stalin, who was suspicious of Hitler’s war 
ambitions in Europe, decided what the Soviet Union needed the most was time; time to rebuild its 
military forces and continue to re-invigorate the Soviet economy.90  
Meanwhile, as France, Britain, Poland, and other nations were becoming extremely 
concerned about Hitler’s war ambitions by 1939, the Soviet Union on the other hand, found 
themselves being the most wanted prize of prewar Europe.  Indeed, if war was imminent, Polish 
officials understood that it would most certainly begin in their territories—as did British and 
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French governments.91  And although the French committed their support for the Poles in the event 
of a German attack, these pledges often played-out behind “political announcements,” which 
carried little weight and exact substance as to what military action the French were willing to take 
if Hitler decided to declare war on Poland.92  As for the British, their Guarantee of Mutual 
Assistance, signed between the British and Poland in late-August 1939, stated neither Britain’s 
military response in the likely event of a German-Polish war, nor did it surmise what Britain’s 
response would be if Poland were attacked by another European power other than Germany.  
Therefore, exactly what course of action the French or the British were willing to employ if an 
assault by Hitler’s armies on Poland was to occur, remained relatively unclear and unspecified.  
Moreover, both the French and British governments adopted the position that unless a viable 
eastern front was established in Poland against the Nazis, and since neither nation had the 
economic or military clout to build-up Polish forces against Hitler’s armies, then Poland’s demise 
was already “assumed to be a foregone conclusion.”93  Still, France and Britain did look towards 
the east to solve this dilemma.  Talks between the French, British, and Soviet governments against 
Hitler’s regime began in early August 1939, with the hopes at least, as far as French and British 
were concerned, that the Soviet Union could serve as a buffer, or at the very minimal, could stall 
Hitler’s armies in the east, thereby allowing the French and British to build up its own forces in 
the West.  Yet, lack of concrete commitments on part of the French and the British pushed Stalin 
to seek accommodations with Hitler.  Consequently, on August 23, Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union had stunned the West by signing a Nonaggression Pact with one another, which 
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fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Europe, and would also seal Poland’s fate in the 
process.94   
 
 
Poland’s Fourth Partition 
Under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet (or Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) Nonaggression Pact, 
Germany and the Soviet Union agreed not to engage one another in military action over the next 
ten years.  In addition, if either nation had become involved in war, then neither side would aid the 
enemy; and unlike treaties of this era, this agreement went into effect immediately after both 
powers had signed the accord.  There was also a secret protocol in the deal that specified the 
spheres of power in Eastern Europe.  Once Hitler and the Nazis invade western Poland, the Soviet 
Union, at a later date, would advance on the eastern frontiers of Poland.  And after achieving 
victory, Poland would be divided along the Pisa, Vistula, San, and Narew rivers—or in short, 
Germany would control the western parts of Poland, while the Soviet Union commanded the 
eastern half (along with Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia).95  As a result of their new accord, on 
September 3, 1939, Hitler gave the order to invade Poland.  Roughly two-weeks later, the Soviet 
Union put into action their part of the secret agreement—it should be noted however, that the secret 
protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was completely unbeknown to the British, French, or Polish 
Governments, it wasn’t until after the war that this revelation came to light.  Under false pretenses, 
the Red Army marched on eastern Poland, all while proclaiming their presence on Polish lands 
was to protect their “unfortunate brethren”—the Ukrainians and Byelorussians—against Nazi 
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aggression, but this was merely a ploy by the Soviets to carry-out their true objectives, which was 
to re-incorporate eastern Poland back into the Soviet Union.96  Other propaganda tactics 
accompanied the Red Army’s march through eastern Poland.  Town after town, city after city, the 
Soviets proclaimed to the Polish people that they were coming as an ally against the Nazi 
invaders.97  Truthfully, many Poles did indeed believe Soviet intentions.  After all, the two nations 
several years earlier, signed a Nonaggression agreement (Polish-Soviet Pact), in which both parties 
agreed to “abstain from all aggressive action or from attack against each other” for the next ten-
years.98  Granted, treaties throughout history have been broken before, as the Soviets actions in 
Poland can testify, but the mere semblance of friendship was enough to blur Polish senses 
concerning the true nature of Soviet objectives in Poland.  But in the end, it would be the acts of 
the Soviets in eastern Poland “which dispelled any illusions” to the real ambitions of the Soviet 
Union.99   
While France and Great Britain immediately declared war on Nazi Germany after Poland 
was invaded on September 3, 1939, no military action by Poland’s allies was taken against Hitler’s 
forces.  British and French authorities limited their engagements against Germany to “verbal 
protest,” all while rejecting the use of their air-forces to come to Poland’s aid.100  This later became 
known to as the Phoney War, that is, while the governments of France and Britain had declared 
war on Hitler’s Germany, no military action was taken against the Germans, leaving Poland 
isolated and alone.  Shortly after the initial attacks on Poland began, the Nazi war machine started 
assaulting Poland with utter relentlessness.  Fortunately, hundreds of Polish officials, including 
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the Polish president, most of his ministers, and entire governmental departments, were evacuated 
from Warsaw and managed to flee to the Rumania border.  As German war planes bombed 
railways, roads, communication lines, and bridges, these same Polish representatives who 
managed to escape the carnage fled Poland in order to establish an exiled government in Allied 
territory, whereby they could control Polish resources abroad and coordinating a plan of defense 
for Poland.101  After two weeks of fighting, Poland was on the verge of defeat, and many Polish 
leaders who had originally escaped now found themselves arrested by Rumanian authorities—who 
were acting on German instructions (a handful of these top Polish officials nonetheless did reach 
French territory, where they established a Polish Government-in-exile, but were forced to flee to 
London after Germany invaded France in May 1940).  And when the Red Army began its advance 
on Poland’s eastern frontiers, this event virtually hastened the inevitable: Poland’s fourth partition.  
As a result of trying to fight a war on two fronts, by early October 1939, Poland was essentially 
finished after a single month of combat, but what happened throughout Poland and other territories 
that were seized by both the Nazis and the Soviets after the invasion by the Germans and later the 
Soviets tells another story.  Hitler and his Nazi regime would apply their extreme racial ideologies 
on millions of Polish people.  Homosexuals, Roma, (or Gypsies), Jehovah Witnesses, Communists, 
the mentally handicapped, and of course Jews, would be liquidated in substantial numbers under 
the theories of Nazism.  This the Nazis applied on all their conquered territories, not just Poland, 
but Jews, both Polish and non-Polish, were exterminated in much greater numbers than any other 
group aforementioned by the Nazi regime.102   
Meanwhile in eastern Poland, hundreds of thousands of Polish civilians and military 
personnel were captured and taken prisoner by the Red Army in late September 1940—it should 
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be noted, that the act of taking prisoners of war was not all that uncommon after a belligerent 
power’s formal declaration of war, but no such declaration against Poland was ever made by the 
Soviet Union.  Nonetheless, heavy deportations and mass executions, especially of Polish judges, 
police officers, army officers, professors, doctors, and the like, by the Soviets, brought about the 
extermination of the Polish intelligentsia.  Under Soviet theory, all leadership, potential or actual, 
must be destroyed in “order to communize and victimize” the less educated, less sophisticated 
elements of a given society.103  Moreover, by removing any hopes that a certain group would 
ameliorate their condition, this in turn would create a complacent society in which the very 
“necessities” of life are dependent upon the will of their Soviet masters.104  Hence, the ultimate 
aim of the Communists was to impose a system of government in Poland that left the population 
into “passive submission,” leaving any challenges to the Soviet regime nonobtainable.105  Beyond 
Soviet acts of violence, Communist officials during the occupation of eastern Poland began to 
forcibly introduce the Stalinist system on the Poles.  Instruction into communist ideology; the 
forbidding of teaching universal history; the removal of native teachers in favor of Russian 
teachers; and the limited instruction of the Polish language, were by and large, carried out with 
brutal and exacting efficiency on Polish institutions and its citizens.106  
However, Soviet ambitions in Poland came to a swift end by 1941.  In late June that same 
year, Operation Barbarossa began—the invasion of Soviet the Union—and the Nonaggression Pact 
between the Soviet Union and Germany was officially over.  As the Nazi war machine set its sights 
on Soviet forces, eastern Poland was the first to fall, and within several weeks after the initial 
German attacks, the Red Army was in full retreat.  Stalin during this time was completely shocked 
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and dismayed by Hitler’s actions.  While he and many of his military commanders were well aware 
that one day the Germans would no doubt engage the Soviets in all-out war, it never occurred to 
them it would arrive so suddenly.   But Germany’s speedy victories in France, Denmark, Norway, 
and other places in Europe during the preceding year, allowed Hitler to expedite his plans against 
the Soviet Union.  In just a few months after the attack on the Soviet Union began, the Germans 
were winning decisive victories; they controlled all of the eastern Poland, including Lithuania, 
Estonia and Latvia, and most of the Ukraine, and by October that same year, the Germans were 
only several kilometers away from capturing the Soviet capital of Moscow.107 
 
The Unearthing of a Crime 
After Nazi Germany’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the 
United States entered the European conflict in December that same year, following the Japanese 
Empire’s surprise attack on U.S. naval forces stationed at Pearl Harbor.  After war was declared, 
the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other Western powers, formed an alliance 
(Allied powers) to topple the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan).  
By early April 1943, a German military unit operating in the vicinity of the Russian city of 
Smolensk (nearly four-hundred kilometers west of Moscow), discovered several mass graves, 
where the bodies of roughly fifteen-thousand Polish officers (who had been slain in the nearby 
Katyn Forest) were buried.  Soon after the discovery, Adolf Hitler and Reich Minister of 
Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, attempted to capitalize on the situation.  Their hope was to exploit 
the Katyn tragedy in order to divide the Allies at a crucial point in the war.  But many Poles after 
the initial discovery of the mass graves by German authorities believed it was nothing more than 
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a Nazi hoax to drive a wedge between the Allies.  Then again, when the first list of names and 
pictures of the deceased appeared in the daily (German-controlled) newspaper, and over the 
German radio, they became convinced in the validity of the crime.108  Yet who was ultimately 
responsible, was still open to Polish scrutiny.  After all, the Poles had been subject to brutal and 
horrific acts of violence by both Soviet and Nazi regimes.  Therefore, the Poles refused to accept 
that the Soviet Union, although capable, was to blame; especially as the Germans’ “pathological 
hate for Polish citizens of Jewish origin” had erupted in Warsaw on April 19 that same year, in 
which the Nazi’s oversaw the mass murder of Polish Jews in the Warsaw ghetto over the following 
four weeks.109 
As for the Allied powers, their preliminary reaction to Katyn was likewise skeptical of Nazi 
claims, as was the response by the Polish Government-in-exile in London.  Indeed, public opinion 
at this time pointed the finger at the Nazis.  However, the Germans were eager to dispel these 
rumors, and invited an independent International Commission, the Polish Red Cross, and a German 
Special Medical-Judiciary Commission, to investigate Katyn.110  The International Commission 
consisted of well-known scholars and specialists in forensic medicine from twelve different 
countries other than Germany.  None of these individuals had any affiliation, or were proponents 
of the Nazism, and they were under no pressure to participate in the investigation by Germany 
authorities.111  As for the Polish Red Cross, their role and examinations of the Katyn site was of 
particular importance for two reasons.  First, its twelve members were very distrustful of the 
Germans, considering what they had witnessed under German occupation over the last three years.  
Secondly, a handful of these representatives were in fact, and unbeknown to the Germans and 
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others in the group, members of the Polish underground, who were even more distrustful of the 
Nazis rather than the Soviets.  Additionally, the Polish underground maintained secret radio 
communications with the Polish Government-in-exile.  Furthermore, Polish nationals at the grave 
sites refused to be pawns in German propaganda.  They adamantly rejected speaking about their 
assessments of the mass graves over the German radio, and refrained from making any anti-Soviet 
statements.  Nonetheless, by April 28, 1943, all three groups arrived at Katyn, and over the next 
few days, their findings and reports unanimously determined that the Polish soldiers were “killed 
and buried about three years before the exhumations,” or a little more than a year prior to 
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union.112  It is suffice to say, that the heart of the initial 
investigation by the International Commission and the Polish Red Cross centered around when the 
Polish officers were killed.   Hence, “if it could be determined when the men were shot, [then] the 
identity of the executioners would be known.”113  
Yet even before the Polish Government-in-exile began receiving reports from the Polish 
underground about the Katyn affair, the London Poles on April 15, 1943, decided to appeal to the 
International Red Cross in Geneva for an impartial investigation.  Ironically on that same day, 
German officials had also formally requested the presence of the International Red Cross to come 
to Katyn.  To outside observers, this turn of events appeared suspicious, especially to the Soviets, 
who now believed that a Polish-German co-conspiracy was taking place.  Regardless, the 
International Red Cross was willing to send a group of impartial delegates to Katyn, but only if all 
parties involved (the Germans, the Poles, and the Soviets) officially requested their support.  But 
the Soviet Union remained silent on the issue, and never sent the International Red Cross a formal 
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appeal for their assistance.  Moreover, the Soviet daily Pravda on April 19, began publishing anti-
Nazi and anti-Polish statements, arguing Hitler and the Polish Government-in-exile were 
collaborating against the Soviet Union.  The Soviets’ main emphasis was the timing of the request 
by both the Polish and German governments to the International Red Cross.  Stalin later wrote to 
Churchill and condemned the action of the Polish Government-in-exile, all while maintaining that 
the Nazis were responsible for the crime.  Stalin also stated that any further belligerence on part of 
the Polish Government-in-exile regarding Katyn will result in the cessation of diplomatic relations 
with the London Poles.  Of course, Churchill denied that the Polish Government-in-exile was 
colluding with the Germans, and even President Roosevelt at this time sent a letter to Stalin 
assuring him no collusion between the London Poles and the Nazis was taking place.  Yet, neither 
Churchill nor Roosevelt initially believed the Soviets were guilty of the massacre, especially since 
much of the details and circumstances surrounding the Katyn affair were not readily available to 
them.  Most importantly however, Allied unity was extremely important for the Western 
governments, particularly for Roosevelt, because Soviet assistance in America’s war against Japan 
was going to be needed to help bring the war in the Pacific to a rapid close.  In addition, by the 
end of spring 1943, the Soviets were on the offensive in the East, forcing the Germans to take a 
defensive posture after their failed attempts to seize the Russian city of Stalingrad and other 
territories throughout Russia.  Indeed, most of the fighting in Europe against the Nazis was taking 
place between the Germans and the Soviets, and by mid-August 1943, the Red Army regained 
control of Smolensk and the Katyn area.  When they did, they too conducted an investigation into 
the Katyn massacre, which rather unsurprisingly, blamed the Nazis for murdering the Polish 
officers.114   
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Meanwhile, relations between the Big Three and the Polish Government-in-exile began to 
deteriorate over the remainder of the war.  It should be noted however, that from the autumn of 
1941, until the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn in April 1943, and after Stalin granted 
amnesty to all Polish citizens and prisoners of war in the Soviet Union after the German invasion, 
General Wladyslaw Sikorski, who was the Prime Minister of the exiled government and 
Commander-in-Chief of Polish forces until his death in early July 1943, along with General 
Wladyslaw Anders, were tasked with locating and assembling Polish forces in the Soviet Union.  
So when Sikorski and Anders came to the conclusion that roughly fifteen-thousand Polish officers 
were still missing, their repeated attempts and conversations with Stalin on the matter ultimately 
yielded little results.  Stalin claimed that the missing officers may have escaped to Manchuria, or 
perhaps returned to Poland without reporting to the Sikorski government of their whereabouts.  
Neither Sikorski nor Anders accepted these assertions however, yet at the same time, they also had 
no evidence to prove otherwise.  Nonetheless, when the Germans announced that roughly fifteen-
thousand Polish officers were discovered at Katyn, Polish suspicions of foul play on part of the 
Soviet’s grew immensely.  Under pressure from Churchill though, the Sikorski government was 
compelled to withdraw their request to the International Red Cross, and Sikorski was specifically 
instructed to make no further inquiries about his missing officers.  While Sikorski privately 
complained to British officials about this decision, no alternatives to rectify the situation were 
available to him.  And since Allied unity, and the fact that the Soviets, not the British or Americans, 
were the primary defenders against Hitler’s forces, then any disruption in those relations could 
significantly undermine the war effort.  Stalin nevertheless decided in June 1943 to break off 
diplomatic ties with the Polish Government-in-exile as a result of the Katyn affair.115    
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On the other hand, the Katyn episode did provide Soviet authorities with an opportunity to 
act upon their long-term goals of realizing a communist Poland.  Several months prior to the 
announced discovery of Katyn, a “Union of Polish Patriots” was created in Russia under Soviet 
sponsorship.116  This group was comprised of Polish Communists, and after Stalin broke off 
diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, he recognized the Union of Polish 
Patriots as the legitimate representatives of the future Polish state.  Fatefully, the whole Katyn 
affair gave Stalin the occasion to discredit the Sikorski government, and allowed him to begin his 
postwar plans for Poland, but Stalin’s actions also strained his relations with the United States and 
Great Britain for the remainder of the war.  In fact, neither governments in the West could officially 
recognize the Union of Polish Patriots as the legitimate government of Poland, especially since 
Great Britain declared war on Germany on behalf of Poland, and both the U.S. and the British 
officially acknowledged the Polish Government-in-exile as the rightful authority over Polish 
affairs.  Moreover, there was a large group of Polish forces fighting alongside the British and the 
Americans in North Africa, most of whom, “did not easily forget Soviet-German co-operation in 
1939,” and the mass deportations, executions, and imprisonment of thousands of Poles that 
followed thereafter.117  So breaking ties with the Polish Government-in-exile was obviously not 
going to happen.  There was little Churchill and Roosevelt could do at this point in regards to 
Katyn.  Both Roosevelt and Churchill had a growing concern that Stalin and Hitler might make a 
separate peace with each other, which was not all that unreasonable considering the Germans and 
the Russians made a separate peace deal in WWI.  At the same time, they couldn’t come out 
directly and blame the Germans for the Katyn crime either, mainly since they could not determine 
with exact certainty that the Nazis were responsible.  And since the Soviet Union provided no 
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evidence to contradict German claims, then essentially Churchill and Roosevelt’s were faced with 
an uneasy situation in regards to Poland and Katyn.  In short, 1943 was a difficult time for the 
British and U.S. governments, their primary concern was seeing the defeat of Hitler and his Nazi 
regime, but in order for that to be accomplished, the Soviet Union and its Red Army were 
extremely important in obtaining that objective.118   
 
Poland, Katyn, and the Postwar World 
By April of 1945, the Second World War in Europe was drawing to a close, all but insuring 
an Allied victory by May that same year.  Even so, the question of the future of Germany and 
Eastern Europe needed to be addressed by the Allies.  In February 1945, the three main power 
brokers of the War—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—met in the Crimea 
(southern Russia) to discuss this very issue.  The key agreements between the Big Three at this 
meeting—known as the Yalta Conference—were that the future governments of Eastern European 
nations that bordered the Soviet Union would be friendly to the Soviet government, and Stalin 
personally agreed to ensure that free elections in all territories liberated from Nazi Germany would 
take place.  In regards to Poland on the other hand, Soviet negotiators insisted on the full inclusion 
of a Polish communist party (Polish Committee of National Liberation, also known as the Lublin 
Committee) in the postwar Polish Government.  But the Lublin Committee had already established 
the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland in Warsaw prior to the Yalta Conference.   
Thus, Soviet negotiators hardly needed the assurance from their Western allies for the presence of 
communist Poles in the postwar Polish Government because they were already firmly in place.119   
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Although Stalin agreed to free and unfettered elections in Poland, the inclusion of Polish 
communists in the government of Poland after the war was extremely important for Stalin.  
Historically, Poland served as a gateway for foreign forces attempting to invade Russia.  According 
to Herbert Feis, the presence of the communist party in Poland after the war would preserve the 
security interests of the Soviet Union, but Edward Rozek contends that this was also part of Stalin’s 
long-term plans to turn all of Poland into a communist state.  As for Churchill and Roosevelt, the 
agreements they made with the Soviet Premier at Yalta was perhaps the best deal they could make, 
considering the fact that by 1943 the Red Army was on the offensive in the East and almost 
singlehandedly turning the tide of the war in Allied favor.  Furthermore, both Western leaders, to 
some degree, trusted Stalin, and they believed he would live up to his end of the bargain concerning 
Poland’s borders after the war.  And even though by 1945 the evidence and circumstances 
surrounding the Katyn massacre pointed towards Soviet responsibility, the greater crimes 
committed by the Nazis ultimately overshadowed those concerns for Roosevelt and Churchill.               
In the meantime, the Germans maintained their innocence for Katyn over the course of the 
war—even after their defeat.  But the issue over which nation was responsible for the massacre 
was hardly over.  Ironically, it was the Soviets who raised the issue of culpability for the Katyn 
massacre during the Nuremburg trials. But Soviet attempts to blame the Germans was a complete 
failure.  In fact, prominent U.S. attorney and chief council for the prosecution Telford Taylor 
“strongly urged Rudenko [chief Soviet prosecutor] not to go forward with the case.”120  According 
to Taylor, “there was a feeling then that the Russians, not the Germans, were guilty” of committing 
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the crime.121  In the end, when the final verdicts at Nuremburg were announced in September of 
1946, nothing at all was said about the Katyn massacre.122   
Nevertheless, as the war was drawing to a close, a new era was being ushered in, one that 
would completely impact the entire globe for generations to come.  When President Roosevelt died 
on April 12, 1945, Harry Truman—then Vice-President—was somewhat of a “mystery to most 
Americans” when he became president in April 1945.123  In time however, Truman would be 
responsible for the moral responsibilities use of atomic weapons, ending the war in Germany and 
Japan, managing the difficult relations with the United States’ faltering alliance with the Soviet 
Union, and initiating policies both home and abroad to strengthen the U.S. economy and rebuild a 
war-torn Europe.124 
Indeed, after being thrusted into the American Presidency, Truman faced some of the most 
daunting and complex problems of any president since Abraham Lincoln.  The decision by Truman 
to use the atomic bombs—“Little Boy” and “Fat Man”—on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August 1945, represented a fundamental shift in the way future armies of the world 
would conduct their strategic military objectives.  Some historians debate whether or not the use 
of the atomic bombs was necessary for the defeat of Japan.  But many officials within the U.S. 
military and government at the time feared that the human cost of invading the Japanese mainland 
would result in heavy loss of life—both military and civilian.  Truman of course chose to use the 
bomb, thereby shocking “Japanese hardliners” into surrender and sparing the U.S. of any further 
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casualties.125  What’s more, even though Stalin at the Conferences at Yalta and Potsdam had agreed 
to send troops to Japan three-months following the defeat of Hitler, many within the Truman 
administration were concerned that the presence of the Red Army in Northeast Asia would see the 
Soviets aiding and supporting communist forces in China.  Perhaps then, detonating the atomic 
bombs and forcing Japan into a quick surrender would keep the Soviets out of Asia, all while 
demonstrating to Stalin “a graphic example of U.S. power in the Soviet’s backyard.”126  
 
The Beginnings of the Cold War  
 Prior to the atomic attacks on the Japanese Empire, tensions between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union began to rise following Germany’s formal surrender on May, 8 1945.  During this 
point in time, U.S. military and political leaders became concerned as the Soviets occupied Berlin, 
East Germany, and controlled massive territories from the Black Sea in Rumania to Poland’s Baltic 
coasts.127  While the Big Three at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, agreed to divide 
Germany into occupation zones after the war, and that the liberated territories from the clutches of 
Nazi hands would have free elections, no official apparatus was put in place guaranteeing the three 
powers would fully cooperate with their agreements.  Thus, when the Soviet Union began annexing 
most of eastern Poland before Germany’s surrender, and when they intended to sign a “treaty of 
mutual assistance” with the Lublin (communist) Polish Government (not officially recognized by 
the U.S. or Great Britain), confirming Polish fears that the Soviets wanted to communize Poland, 
Truman, just eleven days after taking office, faced off with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyachslav 
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Molotov over the Polish question.128  Molotov, who was in the United States awaiting the start of 
the San Francisco Conference in which a new charter for the United Nations was being crafted in 
September 1945, was scolded by Truman for breaking his nation’s Yalta declarations to give 
Poland its independence.  Truman declared that unless the Soviets observed their Yalta 
agreements, then the U.S. Senate “would never approve of American membership in the United 
Nations.”129  Stalin responded by maintaining that the Soviet presence in Poland was to establish 
a “security zone,” but it was clear to U.S. officials that the interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe was more important than preserving the U.S., British, Soviet alliance.130  But as the Big 
Three met again in Potsdam—suburb of Berlin—from July 17 to August 2, 1945, Truman and 
Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, had no “clear understanding” of Stalin’s postwar imperialistic 
objectives.131  Still hoping for Soviet assistance in the war against Japan, combined with the 
knowledge of a great weapon that could annihilate entire cities, and an unwillingness to engage 
the Soviets in all-out war, Truman ultimately tempered his position on Poland, and agreed in the 
meantime, for the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland.132   
Ironically, the start of WWII began with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany in 1939, 
but by the conclusion of the war in 1945, Poland came to signify the ideological Cold War that 
dominate world politics during the second half of the twentieth century.  The future struggles 
between the emerging superpowers—the Unites States and the Soviet Union—would be take place 
in foreign lands, ultimately creating profound and lasting consequences for those nations.133  As 
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the United States emerged from the war relatively unscathed, both in terms of economics and lack 
of physical destruction of its homeland, the baton was passed by the former great powers of Europe 
to the United States to ensure that the peace, security, and the principles of democracy, were 
guarded against communist regimes.  After the war in Europe and the Pacific by August 1945 was 
officially over, U.S. industry had expended tremendously.  While the allies of the United States, 
and its enemies alike, suffered massive financial and physical destruction as a result of the war, 
the same cannot be said of the U.S.  Not only did America’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rise 
from $91 billion in 1939 to $166 billion in 1945, by war’s end, the U.S. produced and consumed 
nearly 43 percent of the world’s electricity, 57 percent of the steel, and 80 percent of 
automobiles.134  Furthermore, the U.S. Navy and Air Force was completely unmatched, and the 
president and his military advisors had sole possession over atomic weapons and its technology.  
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union suffered horrible devastation during the war.  Entire Russian cities 
and rural villages were destroyed by the Nazis, and tens of millions of military personnel and 
civilian lives had been lost.135  Consequently, the United States had a clear advantage over the 
Soviet Union both militarily and economically.136    
Yet the Soviet Union was by no means a weak state.  In fact, as the war destroyed the 
former colonial empires of Europe, a power vacuum in Asia, Africa, and the Middle-East, saw 
national revolutionaries demanding independence, modernization, and an overall higher quality of 
life.  The interests of revolutionary forces around the globe after decolonization eventually became 
the postwar aims of the Soviet Union.  By 1946, the Cold War was beginning to take shape, but 
Truman needed something more other than military and economic might to combat the Soviet 
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Union’s postwar plans.  What he needed was a coherent ideology to oppose communist ideals, 
which was gaining popularity among the former colonial regions that were once controlled by the 
democratic and capitalistic powers of Western Europe.  Then again, numerous revolutionary 
groups in former colonies saw capitalism, and its colonizers, as the main cause of war, economic 
depression, and fascism.137  
As a result, Truman strove to sell American ideology and culture throughout the world, 
making it the most effective weapon against communism—short of all-out war that is.  The Truman 
administration had real cause for concern regarding the growth and expansion of communism by 
1947, as southern Europe began to see a swell in communist ranks. Indeed, between 1935 and 
1945, communist party membership in Greece increased from 17,000 to 70,000, and from 5,000 
to 1,700,000 in Italy.138  In Czechoslovakia, communist membership increased from 28,000 to 
750,000.139  Hence, communism was on the rise, but whether added membership of a communist 
party was the result of anti-democratic principles or admiration of Stalin’s policies, or simply a 
reaction to fascism and Nazism, is a discussion for another time.  By 1946, Truman needed to 
develop a clear policy in response to the rapid changes in global power in a nuclear age.  Forming 
the core of Truman’s foreign policy initiatives, came from Soviet expert George F. Kennan, whose 
famous and widely circulated “Long Telegram,” provided U.S. officials of his insightful views of 
communist ideology in the Soviet Union.140  Kennan, writing as “Mr. X,” argued that communism 
in the Soviet Union was “impervious to the logic of reason,” and that they are inherently 
expansionist, and can only be controlled through “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
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containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”141  As a result, Truman adopted the idea of 
“containment” against Soviet aspirations, which in time, would lay the foundation for U.S. foreign 
policy over the next forty-years.142  
Kennan’s appraisals concerning the Soviet Union rattled U.S. politicians, high-ranking 
military officers, and government officials, but Kennan assured policy makers that Stalin and the 
Soviets did not want war.  Instead, the Soviets believed that the economic depression in Europe 
and Northeast Asia would carry these areas into the “Soviet camp.”143  Nonetheless, Truman, in 
order to fund a massive effort to fight communists around the world, decided to step up his anti-
communists rhetoric.  In a speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman told House and Senate 
members and the American people that “it must be the policy of the Unites States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”144  
This brave new responsibility to combat “communist tyranny” wherever it may occur around the 
globe, ultimately became known as the Truman Doctrine.145  In several speeches thereafter while 
on the campaign trail seeking reelection, Truman painted a grim picture to the American people 
about the dangers concerning the spread of communism.  Truman’s warnings were also the means 
to secure $400 million from Congress to fight communism in Greece and Turkey, all while creating 
a high level of anxiety about communist ideology throughout the U.S.  In response, a second Red 
Scare raced across the nation, over time, the so called Red Scare challenged the basic principles of 
democracy and individual freedom in the United States for many years to come.  Truman 
ultimately gained support from Democrats and Republicans for his policy of containing 
                                                          
141 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950. New York: Pantheon Books, 557. 
142 Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 551-7. and Schaller, Michael and Robert D. Schulzinger, eds. American Horizons. 
975-6. 
143 Schaller, Michael and Robert D. Schulzinger, eds. American Horizons. 976. 
144 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952. Vol 1. Doubleday, 1956. 126.  
145 Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952. 124. 
59 
 
communism, but in order to carry out this policy, the United States needed to completely overhaul 
certain governmental functions and institutions to prepare for a long and protracted Cold War 
against the Soviet Union.  In the end, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was in 
full swing by the late 1940s.  When that happened, politicians in Washington decided to sniff out 
communist sympathizers within the government.  Against this backdrop, the circumstances of 
Katyn massacre would eventually play a pivotal role in that venture.146   
 
Cover-up, Suppression, and the Politics of War 
Until 1951, when the Congress of the United States decided to investigate which nation 
was ultimately responsible for executing the Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, the knowledge 
and details surrounding the crime was suppressed, ignored, or many simply did not believe that 
the Soviets were responsible.  The reasons why the Roosevelt administration, and his war time ally 
Winston Churchill, decided not to investigate the event has already been mentioned.  But the 
question as to why Truman refused to investigate remains unanswered.  However, a closer analysis 
of a handful of those who served in both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, and how the 
Katyn controversy affected their convictions, provides clues as to their motives behind the answers 
to the latter.  In addition, recently declassified documents from the Congressional Hearings will 
also be examined to demonstrate that the U.S. State Department and Army Intelligence both during 
and by wars’ end acted under a veil of secrecy when it came to Soviet transgressions against the 
Poles.   
 Possibly one of the most knowledgeable figures in the Roosevelt and Truman years 
concerning the Soviet Union, and communism in particular, was George F. Kennan.  Born in 
                                                          
146 Schaller, Michael and Robert D. Schulzinger, eds. American Horizons. 976. and Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: 
Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952. 124-5. 
60 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1904, Kennan lived, and eventually served, in a time when the 
geopolitical structures of Europe, the United States, and the entire world, was fundamentally 
changing during the aftermaths of both WWI and WWII.  After graduating from Princeton 
University in 1925, Kennan entered the Foreign Service (FS), and throughout his illustrious career 
as a Foreign Service Officer he witnessed some of the most extraordinary events of the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s.  As the rise of totalitarian regimes, Fascism, Nazism, Communism and Stalinism, 
began to dominate world affairs, Kennan was placed at the forefront of these events, and his 
insights and experiences not only assisted Truman and others in their tough stance against the 
spread of communism after WWII, but it also put him in a position to recognize the importance of 
Poland for Stalin, and how the Katyn massacre effected his actions there.   
In chapter eight of his Memoirs, (Moscow Again—and Poland), Kennan describes how he, 
along with U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, were immersed in the break-
down of diplomatic relations between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Union.  Also 
contained in this chapter is Kennan’s only references to the Katyn massacre, and how that event, 
and other circumstances, paved the way for Stalin to ensure that a communist puppet regime would 
be established in Poland after the war.  It should be noted however, that Kennan refrains from 
interpreting his thoughts in hindsight.  According to Kennan, “the papers from which were taken 
the excerpts dealing with the Polish problem…were reproduced either entirely from private ones, 
shown to no one at the time, or memos written for the ambassador.”147  Thus, his perspectives on 
Katyn, the Polish question, the Soviet Union, and the Polish Government-in-exile, contained in 
this chapter, are from Kennan’s personal diary, notes, or other unpublished documents he had in 
his possession between 1944 and 1945.   
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Kennan’s first conversation concerning Katyn transpired just before he returned to Moscow 
in 1944, when he and Jan Wszelaki (counselor to the Polish embassy in Washington), discussed 
“the motives and purposes of the Soviet government” for breaking off diplomatic ties with the 
Polish Government-in-exile after they requested the International Red Cross to investigate the 
Katyn crime.148  Kennan says, that he “came away from [the] discussion with a strong feeling” that 
Stalin’s hostilities towards the Polish Government-in-exile was not only the result of his nation’s 
much improved military position in Eastern Europe by 1944, but most importantly, because Katyn, 
and other violent acts perpetrated against the Poles by Soviet authorities between 1939-1940, was 
an “embarrassment” to Stalin and the Soviet Union.149  Therefore, Kennan theorized:  
What was bothering Stalin was not, as many of our people tended to assume, just 
the desire to have a ‘friendly government’ on the other side of the Polish frontier.  
What was bothering him was the need for the collaboration of any future Polish 
political authority in repressing evidences and memories of actions by Soviet 
authorities in the period 1939-1940, for which no adequate and respectable excuse 
could ever be found.150 
 
In short, Kennan believed that Stalin wanted no government in Poland during the postwar era to 
either have the “inclination or the ability” to investigate the crimes of the past, and “make public 
issue of these actions” by the Soviet government.151  And yet, while this is an extremely insightful 
view of Stalin’s actions, one in which others during this time failed to recognize, two important 
questions still remain: who did Kennan believe was responsible for the massacre at Katyn, and 
what role did he play in suppressing the circumstances of Katyn after the war?   
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The answer to the former lies in a single passage in his Memoirs where Kennan declares, 
that “when it came to the murdered officers, I had no proof—nothing more than a general intuitive 
ideas—as to what was likely and what unlikely to have been the case.”152  He goes on to say:  
I was not familiar with any of the documentation beyond what the Soviet 
government had itself seen fit to publish in the press.  I could not take upon myself 
the burden of trying to prove, from my modest vantage point, charges of the most 
grievous nature against the Soviet government, and particularly ones which my own 
government did not wish to have raised or discussed.  I therefore fell in, at least 
when it came to official correspondence, with the tacit rule of silence which was 
being applied at that time to the unpleasant subject in question.153 
 
According to Kennan, he was neither in the position to know the details of Katyn between 1943 
and 1945, nor was the subject to be brought up in any official communications.  Kennan was also 
not the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, the Secretary of State, or close advisor to Roosevelt. 
Therefore, considering Kennan’s relatively lower position in the Foreign Service, and the fact that 
Kennan had no formal or personal relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, then it is quite 
plausible that the details of the massacre were simply unknown to him.  While Kennan throughout 
his Memoirs discusses in great detail his dislike for the Soviet system and communism in general, 
no reference to who he believed was accountable for the killings at Katyn is mentioned.  The only 
exception to his beliefs is a brief passage in the same chapter where he discusses why he thought 
the Polish officers were executed by the Soviets not the Germans.  But this passage is 
retrospective—these were not the perspectives Kennan held during his time in Moscow in 1944-
1945.  
 To answer the final question, as to what role did Kennan play in suppressing the Katyn 
massacre after the war, that answer is not all that difficult to answer: probably none.  When the 
war in Europe came to official end in May of 1945, Kennan remained in Moscow and served as 
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“chargé d’affaires” of the U.S. embassy while Ambassador Harriman was assigned to “temporary 
duties elsewhere.”154  Over the following nine months, Kennan carried out his responsibilities of 
entertaining dignitaries and acted as interpreter for U.S. Congressmen and Senators who arranged 
personal meetings with Stalin or other Soviet officials.  It is also during this time in February 1946 
when Kennan drafted his famous Long Telegram to Washington, which outlined the “basic 
features of the Soviet postwar” attitudes, and how the Soviet government would officially and 
unofficially effect “American [foreign] policy” in Europe.155  So detailed and insightful were 
Kennan’s thoughts regarding the Soviet Union’s postwar aspirations, that President Truman read 
the telegram, and the Secretary of Navy, James Forrestal, “had it reproduced and made it required 
reading for hundreds…of higher officers in the armed forces.”156  Even the State Department 
praised Kennan for his intuitive and well-developed narrative “to the dangers of the Communist 
conspiracy” within Stalin’s Russia.157  The success of the Long Telegram changed Kennan’s life 
completely.  “My name was now known in Washington,” Kennan says, and as a result, Kennan 
was transferred to Washington and was “assigned as the first ‘deputy for foreign affairs’ at the 
newly established National War College.”158   
For the next eight months, Kennan lectured future military officers and other students on a 
variety of subjects (most particularly on the Soviet Union) throughout the country, but in April of 
1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall requested Kennan’s presence back at the State 
Department to assist in the formation of a “Policy Planning Staff,” which would develop policies 
concerning the “European recovery” effort, and present those ideas directly to the Secretary 
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(Marshall).159  In time, Kennan, as head of the Planning Staff, helped draft some of the basic 
principles and ideas of the Marshall Plan.  Of course, as Kennan so graciously states, “the 
authorship of the Marshall Plan lies…squarely with General Marshall and President Truman.” 160  
Also during his time at the State Department, and as stated beforehand, Kennan authored his 
notorious X-Article, which appeared in the 1947 July issue of Foreign Affairs, under the title, The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct.161  The X-Article and the Long Telegram written by Kennan eventually 
became linked to the Truman Doctrine.  That is, the idea that Soviet power and communism should 
be contained at all cost.  However, Kennan asserts that the X-Article had “serious deficiencies,” 
and much of what he had written was either taking out of context, or he himself failed to make 
clear that “containment” was not to be achieved militarily, but “politically.”162   
Regardless, Kennan’s postwar service as chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow 
to his time at the National War College and State Department, left him in no better position to 
reveal, suppress, or have knowledge of certain facts of the Katyn massacre.  In short, Kennan, was 
engaged and preoccupied with other matters to be part of some vast conspiracy to conceal the 
circumstances surrounding the crime from the American public.  Furthermore, to do so would have 
been uncharacteristic of Kennan.  Indeed, throughout his Memoirs, Kennan discusses extensively 
how, he, throughout his life, was an introverted, very shy, and very reserved individual, and he 
didn’t do anything extraordinary to draw attention to himself.  It was only after the Long Telegram 
where higher authorities of the State Department and the White House started to heed his advice 
regarding the Soviets.  Finally, Kennan respected the chain of command.  For him to reveal certain 
information concerning foreign policy to the American people, whether he agreed with it or not, 
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could only be done and approved through proper channels of the U.S. government—even his X-
Article was “cleared for publication” by James Forrestal.163  So for Kennan to take action outside 
of Department rules, was not something in his nature to do.  On a final note, to emphasize his lack 
of involvement in the Katyn cover-up, Kennan never testified, or was ever subpoenaed to testify, 
to the Congressional Hearings on Katyn in 1951.  Does that mean he’s innocent?  Not necessarily.  
But the Hearings on Katyn by Congress (if one should read in its entirety), to reiterate, was one of 
the most comprehensive and thorough investigations ever taken up by Congress, therefore, any 
trace or evidence of Kennan’s involvement in concealing knowledge about the crime to the 
American people or other government officials certainly would have warranted his testimony. 
If there was one individual who was in the position to know the facts and details of the 
Katyn massacre from all governments involved—the U.S., British, Soviet, and Polish 
Government-in-exile—that would be Averell Harriman.  Harriman was born in New York City in 
1891, and was the son of the legendary railroad baron, Edward Henry Harriman.164  As a young 
man Averell attended Groton Boarding School in Massachusetts, and it is here that Harriman 
befriended Eleanor Roosevelt’s younger brother, Hall Roosevelt, and came to know Franklin 
Roosevelt—who also went to Groton.165  After graduating from Yale University in 1913, Harriman 
joined the family business—the Union Pacific Railroad—where he trained in “all aspects of 
railroading,” including “train operation, [and] track and shop maintenance.”166  A few years later, 
Harriman was promoted to “vice president in charge of purchases” at the Union Pacific’s 
headquarters in New York.167  By the early 1920s, Harriman, unable to confine his energies and 
                                                          
163 Kennan, George F., Memoirs, 356.  
164 William Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation. 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. v. 
165 William Averell Harriman and Elie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946. 1975. 3.  
166 Harriman, William Averell, and Elie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946. 45. 
167 Harriman, William Averell, and Elie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946. 45.  
66 
 
ambitions working for the Union Pacific and recognizing that the United States was the leading 
creditor nation after WWI, decided to try his hand at “international banking and investment.”168   
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Harriman and his investment company devoted 
much of their funds in European ventures—particularly in the Soviet Union.  This also coincided 
with Harriman’s earlier beliefs that the Bolshevik Revolution would provide him with the 
opportunity to establish relations with Soviet Russia, but his initial interest in Russia was political, 
not economic.169  But his firm’s enterprises in the Soviet Union were short lived.  After Harriman 
personally went to Moscow in December of 1926, where he met and conversed with Leon Trotsky 
(who at the time was chairman of the Concessions Committee of the Supreme Economic Council, 
which was tasked with managing the nation’s industrial and forestry economies), regarding his 
firms investments in a manganese mine near Tiflis, located in the Soviet Caucasus, it was clear to 
him “that the days of the NEP [New Economic Policy], and foreign concessions were 
numbered.”170  So Harriman left the Soviet Union with no alternative but to recommend to his 
associates that they should end their business dealings with the Soviets.171 
Shortly after his business dealings in the Soviet Union, Harriman became interested in 
American politics.  When FDR became President in 1933, Harriman got involved in Roosevelt’s 
New Deal reforms.  Roosevelt ultimately appointed Harriman as the deputy administrator of his 
National Recovery Administration (NRA).  He later became its chief administrative officer, until 
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the Supreme Court ruled the NRA was unconstitutional in 1935.  However, his experiences 
working in the NRA provided Harriman with important knowledge about American industry, and 
that understanding helped prepare him for his next task of mobilizing America’s resources in 
wartime.172  
 With war raging on in Europe by 1941, Roosevelt asked Harriman to go to London “and 
recommend everything that we can do, short of war, to keep the British Isles afloat.”173  Harriman 
acted as Roosevelt’s personal representative in London, reporting directly to the President, and not 
the State Department.174  As Roosevelt’s “Special Envoy,” Harriman helped coordinate the Lend-
Lease program (a program which supplied food, oil, weapons, warships, vehicles, and other 
material aid to Britain, Free France, and later the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945) directly 
with Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  Over the course of the war, Harriman became immersed 
in numerous aspects of the U.S. and Allied war effort in Europe, whether it involved economics 
or foreign policy.  In 1943, Harriman was appointed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.  During 
his time overseeing the Lend-Lease program and his ambassadorship in the Soviet Union, 
Harriman maintained constant one-on-one and written communications with Roosevelt, Churchill, 
Stalin, and other high-ranking officials from all three governments.  Furthermore, Harriman 
attended and took part in the discussions at all three major conferences of the war between the Big 
Three—Casablanca, Tehran, and Yalta.175 
 After the war in Europe, Harriman continued to serve as ambassador to the Soviet Union 
under the Truman administration until January of 1946, moreover, he took part in the discussions 
at the Potsdam Conference and the United Nations Conference in San Francisco—both of which 
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took place in 1945.  In addition, Harriman became U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom in 
April of 1946 following his ambassadorship to Moscow.  In October that same year, he was 
nominated by President Truman, and later appointed by Congress, as U.S. Secretary of Commerce 
(a post he held until 1948).  And finally, Harriman assisted greatly in coordinating the Marshall 
Plan throughout Europe between 1948 and 1950.   
As one can see, Averell Harriman led an extraordinary life, to say the least.  Actually the 
aforesaid are but just a few examples of his legendary life and profession as a wealthy businessman 
who turned politician and respected diplomat.  Indeed, much more could be said about the man, 
but that is hardly necessary for this analysis.  Nonetheless, Harriman, more so than Kennan, was 
in a much better position to know the details regarding the crime at Katyn.  Yet like Kennan, what 
he knew and who he personally believed was responsible, or what role he played in suppressing 
the affair from the American public after the war, is a different matter altogether. 
Unfortunately throughout Harriman’s memoirs, Katyn is vaguely referenced.  While he 
devotes an entire chapter to the problems of Poland, titled, Poland, the Touchtone, this chapter 
mainly details his efforts in getting Stalin to recognize the Polish Government-in-exile after their 
cessation of diplomatic relations in 1943, and also his problems getting the latter to make 
concessions to Stalin and the Soviet regime concerning the postwar boundary issues of the eastern 
frontiers of Poland.  In regards to what Harriman does mention in his memoirs concerning Katyn, 
that information can be found in a single passage in his memoirs. According to Harriman, while 
he was in London in May of 1943—a month after the Germans announced the discovery of the 
mass graves at Katyn—Harriman had a discussion with General Sikorski about Sikorski’s 
government’s request for the International Red Cross to investigate the grave sites.176  Harriman 
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states, that he “asked [Sikorski] bluntly why the message had been sent to the International Red 
Cross…[and]…I put it to him that whether the German accusations turned out to be true or false, 
the Polish statement was bound to have a disastrous effect in Moscow.”177  Sikorski, in reply to 
Harriman, responded, “even though he [Sikorski] believed the Russians were responsible for the 
Katyn massacre, he would try to patch things up with Stalin.”178  This is the only reference to the 
Katyn massacre that Harriman makes in his memoirs.  But in 1951, Harriman, who was 
subpoenaed by Congress to testify about his knowledge of the Katyn massacre, stated to the 
Committee members that he “got to know General Sikorski well” during his time in London.179  
Thus, is it possible that these two individuals, who knew each other for several years, had a much 
more broader conversation about why Sikorski thought the Soviets, and not the Nazis, were 
responsible for the crime?  That remains unclear in Harriman’s memoirs and his testimony.  
However, it is not all that unreasonable to assume that they did.   
Going back to Harriman’s testimony before the Congressional Committee, Harriman 
claims that when the mass graves were discovered by the Germans, he recalled “the announcement 
of the Germans of this massacre, but [he] had no knowledge of it except what [he] saw in the 
British press at the time.”180  Harriman continues to assert to the members of the Congressional 
Committee that he knew little about the details of the killings while the war was still ongoing.181  
However, Harriman later testifies that in early January of 1944, he sent his daughter, Kathleen 
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(who was with Harriman during his five years oversees in London and Moscow), along with John 
Melby (embassy staff member in Moscow), to accompany a U.S. delegation to investigate 
Katyn.182   This event took place shortly after the Soviets regained control of the Katyn area in the 
previous months, and after the Soviets invited the American press to examine the mass graves.  
Shortly after Kathleen’s and Melby’s inspection of the mass graves, each wrote a detailed report 
on what they witnessed, and Harriman sent their combined reports to the State Department along 
with a “brief message to the President and the Secretary of State,” describing their “impressions” 
of the crime.183  Those reports sent by Harriman concluded that the “general evidence and 
testimony are inconclusive, but Kathleen and Embassy staff member believe probability massacre 
perpetrated by Germans.”184  Thus, this perhaps answers the question regarding who Harriman 
believed was responsible for the massacre.  Certainly his daughter’s opinion on the matter 
influenced his beliefs.  And although Harriman states to the Committee that the reports he sent to 
Washington “did not express any personal opinion” from his perspective, that doesn’t mean he 
didn’t nonetheless form an opinion, and it’s not all that illogical to assume that Kathleen’s 
estimations didn’t sway his judgements, or cast doubts in his mind that the Soviets were 
responsible.185  
Yet, did Harriman play a major role in suppressing the Katyn affair after the war?  Perhaps 
not deliberately, but he may have had other reasons for not drawing attention to the issue.  Indeed, 
while Harriman, like Kennan, became involved in various government activities after the war, and 
                                                          
182 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, The Katyn Forest Massacre. 
2105. 
183 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, The Katyn Forest Massacre. 
2105. 
184 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, The Katyn Forest Massacre. 
2124.  See Exhibit 24 for full details. 
185 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, The Katyn Forest Massacre. 
2125.   
71 
 
was far too engaged to be preoccupied with a single atrocity among the hundreds that occurred 
during the war, there are a few things within his memoirs that provide other motives why Harriman 
may not have been so forthcoming about his knowledge of Katyn.  For example, it is clear in 
Harriman’s memoirs that he was a Roosevelt loyalist.  He greatly admired and respected his 
longtime friend, and was a staunch proponent of the New Deal reforms.  Therefore, failures of 
Roosevelt and others to convince Stalin to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Polish 
Government-in-exile, and also Western governments failures to get Stalin to live up to his Yalta 
agreements—regardless of the Soviet Union’s military control over the region—these events 
ultimately left a blemish on Roosevelt’s legacy.  So Harriman perhaps didn’t want to draw attention 
to the more tarnishing aspects of the Roosevelt war years while he was still serving in government.   
Finally, Harriman was well respected by the Soviets, both during, and long after the war.  
In fact, in 1963, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev once told Harriman that:  
I and my comrades regard you, Mr. Harriman, with highest esteem.  Your work as 
Ambassador left a deep and favorable impression here.  We all agree that we would 
like to return our relations to the state they were in during the period you served 
here.186   
 
That relationship which Harriman developed throughout his career with the Soviets might have 
been “friendly and frank but firm” according to Harriman, but that would not have been the case 
if he exposed the Katyn controversy in a public manner—which most certainly would have drawn 
the ire and indignation from the Soviets.187  And so, protecting Roosevelt’s legacy, and preserving 
his well-established associations with the Soviets, conceivably meant Harriman had personal 
reasons for remaining silent on the Soviets’ crime at Katyn.  However, there appears to be no 
evidence to prove that Harriman was part of a substantial conspiracy within the State Department 
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to suppress the crime though either.  It is therefore more sensible to assume that he didn’t believe 
the Soviets were guilty of the crime, and the influence of his daughter’s opinion helped sway him 
to that conclusion.   
If there is one person in this analysis who is shrouded in slight bit of controversy regarding 
Katyn, than that person may very well be Dean Acheson.  Born in Middletown, Connecticut, on 
April 11, 1893, Acheson lived a privileged life since his mother, Eleanor Gooderham, was the 
daughter of “a wealthy banker and distiller in Toronto.”188  His father, Edward Acheson, became 
an Episcopal clergyman after he fought in the Crimean War (1853-1856), and later became Bishop 
of the Episcopalian rectory in Middletown.189  Five years after FDR graduated from Groton 
Boarding School, Acheson also attended Groton in 1905, and this is where he met and came in 
contact with Averell Harriman, who was in his final year there.  After Groton, Acheson attended 
Yale, and graduated from college in 1915 before deciding to continue his post-graduate studies at 
Harvard Law School.  But with the possibility of war breaking out with Mexico in 1917, Acheson 
joined the Yale Battery National Guard unit that was stationed near the Pocono Mountains in 
Northeastern part of Pennsylvania before eventually serving in a Brooklyn Navy Yard naval 
auxiliary unit during WWI.190  Following his brief stint in the Naval Reserve, Acheson returned to 
Harvard Law in 1918.  After earning his law degree, Felix Frankfurter landed him a job as clerk 
to the new Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis.191   
By 1921, Acheson decided to leave his clerkship with Brandeis for the rising law firm of 
Covington, Burling and Rublee.  Several years later, he made partner.  It is also during this time 
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that Acheson became heavily involved in the Democratic Party, as “Republican protectionism,” 
which Acheson opposed, began to dominate the political landscape in the late 1920s.192  When 
FDR assumed the presidency in 1933, Acheson, upon the request of Secretary of the Treasury 
William Wooden, was asked by Wooden and Roosevelt to serve as undersecretary of the Treasury, 
but when Wooden fell gravely ill, Acheson became the “‘virtual Secretary of the Treasury.”’193  
However, Roosevelt and Acheson got into a very heated dispute concerning Roosevelt’s decision 
to raise the nation’s income and create jobs by “deliberately stirring inflation.”194  Having strongly 
opposed this course of action, Acheson decided to resign, and returned to law and his firm—which 
was now Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson, and Shorb.195  Throughout the rest of the 1930s, 
Acheson’s firm grew quite prosperous as New Deal regulations brought in a multitude of new 
clients.  Overtime, Roosevelt and Acheson reconciled their differences, and many attempts were 
made by FDR to lure Acheson “back to public service,”—all of which Acheson declined.196  But 
on February 2, 1941, with war raging on in Europe, Roosevelt asked Acheson to serve as Assistant 
Secretary of Economic Affairs under Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and this time, Acheson 
accepted.197   
Like Averell Harriman, but in much greater capacity, Acheson assisted in implementing 
the Lend-Lease program to deliver economic and military aid to Great Britain, but he also played 
a key role in supporting and promulgating the oil embargo against the Japanese Empire in 1941, 
further escalating the tensions between the U.S. and Japan.  During the war in Europe, and 
eventually Japan, Acheson remained as Assistant Secretary of State, until President Truman 
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selected him to serve as Undersecretary of the State Department in 1945.  Acheson remained 
Undersecretary and worked closely with Secretaries Edward Stettinius, Jr., James F. Byrnes, and 
George Marshall, before ultimately becoming Secretary of State himself in 1949.   
Some of Acheson’s most noteworthy achievements in the Truman administration included 
drafting Truman’s speech (Truman Doctrine) before a joint session in Congress on March 12, 
1947—which of course stressed the dangers of totalitarian regimes, and that the United States 
would provide political, military and economic aid to any democratic nation that was threatened 
by authoritarian forces.198  Furthermore, Acheson assisted in designing many features of the 
Marshall Plan.  According to Acheson, the United States’ “objective was not relief, but to revive 
agriculture, industry, and trade so that stricken countries [free areas of Europe] might be self-
supporting.”199  Finally, Acheson was the key architect in the creation  of NATO, and on April 4, 
1949, it would be Acheson, not President Truman, who signed that accord.  Actually Truman 
requested that Acheson sign the treaty as reward for his diligence and work in persuading the 
original members of NATO to agree to the terms and conditions of the alliance.200 
In regards to Katyn, and what information or reports concerning the massacre was 
accessible to him, and most importantly, who he believed was responsible for the crime, neither 
the former nor the latter is mentioned in Acheson’s memoirs.  Furthermore, the issues in relation 
to Poland’s postwar problems is briefly discussed by Acheson.  The question then becomes why 
does Acheson refrain from discussing these events?  Certainly Acheson’s involvement and 
position in the State Department throughout WWII meant that the tensions between the Big Three 
and the Polish Government-in-exile afforded him with the knowledge of how and why those 
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relationships deteriorated.  And the Polish problem was by no means a trivial issue during or after 
the war.  Silence on the issues about Katyn and the many problems facing Poland is in many ways 
Acheson’s own omission that he didn’t want to get into the controversial aspects of history.  
Actually, avoiding controversy in Acheson’s personal writings is not the first time that has 
happened.  According to Robert L. Beisner, Acheson, in his memoirs, Morning and Noon, (which 
details the significant aspects of his early life, from his birth to his swearing in as Assistant 
Secretary of State) omits entirely his years at Groton Boarding school.  Beisner claims this was 
because Acheson’s experience at Groton wasn’t a pleasant one, and he was nearly expelled for his 
constant misbehavior, irresponsibility, and poor grades—a trait that carried with him in his college 
years.201   
There is one source that might explain why Acheson may have refrained from discussing 
Katyn.  In a magazine article written in the American Mercury by Felix Wittmer in April 1952, 
titled, Freedom’s Case Against Dean Acheson, Wittmer claims that after the “Soviet satellite 
government of Poland applied to the United States for a loan of $90,000,000” in 1946, it was 
Acheson’s law firm—Covington, Burling, Rublee, Acheson, and Shorb—that secured that loan.202  
Furthermore, Wittmer also asserts that Donald Hiss, the brother of the accused and eventual 
convicted Soviet spy Alger Hiss, was directly responsible for securing the loan.203  Wittmer goes 
on to state, that after “Acheson announced that the loan, to be made through the Export-Import 
Bank, had been approved” by the United States, Acheson’s law firm received over $50,000 in fees 
for procuring the loan.204   
                                                          
201 Beisner, Robert L., Dean Acheson: A Life in The Cold War. 8. 
202 Felix Wittmer, Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson. American Mercury, 1952. 7. 
203 Wittmer, Felix, Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson. 7.  
204 Wittmer, Felix, Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson. 7.  
76 
 
To corroborate Wittmer’s claims, Arthur Bliss Lane—who was U.S. Ambassador to Poland 
between 1945 and 1949—writes in his memoirs that he warned U.S. officials to not go through 
with the loan.  In 1946, Lane claims he informed Washington that the current Polish Government 
was controlled by Polish Communists, and he stressed that those funds will go directly into the 
pockets of Soviet authorities who were orchestrating the events behind the scenes prior to the 
upcoming election.  Lane writes that he urged Acheson specifically to halt “all further financial 
assistance from the Polish Government” until the elections of 1947 in Poland were fully 
“fulfilled.”205  But Lane declares, that “Acheson’s attitude” in regards to his request “was 
characteristically non-committal,” and that Acheson refused to have any further discussion about 
the matter.206  While this is a smoking gun against Acheson, it does substantiate Wittmer’s 
accusations, and raises suspicious activities about Acheson’s role in his firm’s business dealings 
with the Soviet Union after WWII.  Then again, in 1949, at Acheson’s confirmation hearing for 
Secretary of State, he claims that he “severed his connection with the firm when he entered 
government in 1941.”207  Yet he also admits that he returned to his law firm after he briefly left 
the State Department in 1947.208  Wittmer however, counters this argument by claiming that what 
Acheson meant by “out,” was to be understood by those around him as “temporary.”209  And that’s 
why, according to Wittmer, Acheson received “mail at both the law office and the State 
Department” while he was in government.210  Again, this is hardly damning evidence against 
Acheson, especially as it relates to Katyn.  But on the other hand, Wittmer points out other 
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occurrences where Acheson and his firm had dealings with the Soviet Union before, during, and 
after the war as well.  In short, Wittmer portrays Acheson as a communist sympathizer in his 
article.  Consequently, further research into Wittmer’s allegations and Acheson’s connections with 
the Soviet Union should be investigated more thoroughly.  Then perhaps a greater understanding 
of what role Acheson played in suppressing the Katyn massacre after the war, and what he knew, 
and who he believed was responsible, might become clearer. 
Of all the sources discussed, if there was one individual who was not only in the position 
to know the facts and circumstances surrounding the Katyn controversy, and who, without 
question, had the power to release that information to the American people, that man would be 
none other than President Harry Truman.  Harry Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri on May 8, 
1884.211  After Truman’s family moved to Independence, Missouri, Truman attended the 
Presbyterian Church Sunday School and excelled in his early studies. Truman respected his 
teachers and became an avid reader.  He even claimed to have read the bible twice by the time he 
was twelve years of age.212   Encouraged by his mother, with whom he was very close, Truman 
developed a passion for music, the study of war, but most importantly, history.  In addition, 
Truman was also one of the few boys in Independence to attend high school—in fact, his class 
consisted of thirty girls and just eleven boys.  One year after graduating from high school in 1901, 
calamity struck the Truman family.  Truman’s father’s “luck on wheat futures” left the family 
nearly bankrupt, and they were forced to move to Kansas City shortly thereafter.  As a result of his 
father’s financial troubles, and since West Point had turned him down on account of his poor 
eyesight, Truman was unable to attend college.  To assist his family in their financial woes, Truman 
took several jobs, which included working in the mailroom at the Kansas City Star, timekeeper on 
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the Santa Fe Railroad, clerk at the National Bank of Commerce in Kansas, and he even enlisted in 
the Missouri National Guard in 1905 and served until 1911.213 
As the United States was prepared to enter the First Great War in Europe in 1917,  Truman 
was already thirty three years old at that time—“which was two years beyond the age limit set by 
the new Selective Service Act.”214  Truman nonetheless was allowed to rejoin the Missouri 
National Guard, and helped recruit fellow Missourians in his old artillery unit.  Eventually Truman 
and his unit were deployed to France in 1918, he was promoted to captain, and became commander 
of Battery D of the 2nd Battalion, 129th Field Artillery unit, also known as “Dizzy D.”215  After 
numerous battles throughout the war, Truman’s unit lost not a single man under his command, but 
most importantly, his experiences in Europe and the leadership qualities he gained there prepared 
Truman for his postwar political career in Missouri.  
When Kansas City political boss and chairman of the Jackson County Democratic Party 
Tom Pendergast, was looking for an “honest and honorable man” that could help his organization 
win the “country vote,” Pendergast turned to Truman.216  Pendergast, who used a vast network of 
friends and family to get local politicians elected to public office by handing out government 
contracts and patronage jobs, approached Truman to see if he was interested in running for eastern 
judge of Jackson County—“a courthouse job in Independence, which under the Missouri system 
was not a judicial post but administrative,” similar to that of county commissioner.217  Truman 
having accepted, had won the election in the fall of 1923.  Three years later, Truman decided to 
run for the post of presiding judge in Jackson County, a position which not only paid more, but 
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also came with greater authority and responsibility.  With the aid and support of the Pendergast 
political machine, Truman was once again easily elected, and ended up serving consecutive terms 
from January 1927 to January 1935.218  Throughout his time as presiding judge in Jackson County, 
Truman was respected and well-liked among his fellow Missourians, but with the Great 
Depression still gripping the nation, and since Truman declared “his all-out faith in the New Deal,” 
and was involved in implementing federal reforms in Jackson County, Truman decided he could 
make a greater contribution to that effort by running for the U.S. Senate in 1934.219 
In time, Truman was elected and reelected in the 1934 and 1940 senatorial campaigns, and 
achieved some notoriety while in public office.  But when President Roosevelt’s health started to 
deteriorate by 1944, and since many in the Democratic party had strongly opposed then Vice-
President Henry Wallace, those closest to the President wanted a vice-president who would not 
only be competent enough to become commander-in-chief of the United States in the likely event 
Roosevelt died while in office, but they also needed someone “who would do the ticket the least 
harm” in the 1944 presidential election.220  Much debate transpired throughout this time on who 
that man should be, and while Truman was considered throughout, Truman won the nomination, 
and he considered others within the party were more qualified than he to assume those 
responsibilities.  Additionally, Roosevelt hardly knew the Senator from Missouri, and Truman by 
no means was his first choice.  Political infighting among Democrats plagued the Democratic 
National Convention of 1943 over the issue of the vice-presidency, but Truman ultimately emerged 
as the top choice among the delegates, securing 1,031 votes in the process to join the Roosevelt 
ticket in the 1944 election.221  When Roosevelt died while in office in early April 1945, Truman, 
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who initially didn’t want to become Roosevelt’s vice-president, became the thirty-third President 
of the United States.222   
In regards to Katyn, it is difficult to ascertain what Truman knew about the affair, who he 
believed was responsible, and what role he played in concealing the circumstances of the crime 
from the American people.  The reason for this is because Katyn is not mentioned in either volumes 
of Truman’s memoirs—Year of Decisions or Years of Trials and Hope.  This is astonishing 
considering that Truman devotes a significant portion in both volumes to the Polish question.  
Indeed, according to Truman, and after he just assumed office, “it had become apparent [to 
him]…that what we actually faced in Poland was not merely a political situation but one that 
threatened civil war.”223  Truman goes on to state that the reports presented to him by the State 
Department, and after reading “secret messages and cables” between the Big Three regarding the 
Polish question, he concluded “that the Russians had no intentions…of seeing a new provisional 
government of national unity organized on the lines to which they had agreed at Yalta.”224  It is 
clear that the issue of Poland dominated Truman’s early thoughts, and he rightfully understood 
that Stalin wasn’t going to live up to the Yalta accords.  But in 1945 with the United Nations 
Conference in San Francisco about to begin, and since the Soviet Union was a major power during 
those negotiations, this meant Truman had to tread lightly on certain matters, but stand firm on 
other issues where he could.   
Nonetheless, what facts did Truman have at his disposal concerning the Katyn massacre?  
That answer too remains unclear in Truman’s memoirs.   However, Truman does mention that the 
situation in Poland arose as a result of the “cooled” relationship between the British and the Polish 
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Government-in-exile.225  Certainly then, Truman was well aware that that “cooling” was the 
product of the Katyn controversy.  And he must have also comprehended that the Polish 
Government-in-exile’s persistent accusations against the Soviets for the crime is what led to break-
down of the relations between the two.  Furthermore, Truman proclaims that he has a “retentive” 
memory, and “on that first full day as President I did more reading than I ever thought I could.”226  
One can only surmise that the top secret documents, memos, and reports concerning the war effort 
being fought on both fronts during the Roosevelt years occupied his studies.  Therefore, is it 
possible Truman came across George Howard Earle III’s report which highlighted Soviet 
culpability concerning the Katyn massacre?  This report will be explained in more detail in the 
subsequent section, but if he had, then Truman may very well have known about the killings shortly 
after taking office.  
 There is perhaps one slight bit of evidence on the other hand that proves Truman was well 
aware of the details about Katyn and the Soviets guilt of the affair after he took office.  According 
to the author and historian Robert J. Donovan in his 1977 book, Conflict of Crisis. The Presidency 
of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948, cites an interview he conducted with John Snyder (United States 
Secretary of Treasury from 1946-1953, and close and personal friend of Truman’s) in 1974, where 
Truman apparently made an off the cuff remark to Stalin about the Katyn massacre at the Potsdam 
Conference in 1945.  According to Snyder, Truman, on his return home from Potsdam, confided 
to Snyder that in “one of his casual chats with Stalin and he” Truman asked Stalin bluntly what 
happened to the Polish officers at Katyn, to which Stalin “coldly” replied, “They went away.”227  
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Snyder claims in his interview with Donovan that Truman was “appalled” by Stalin’s answer.228  
While Truman discusses extensively in his memoirs his time and dealings with Stalin at the 
Potsdam Conference, this reference to the Katyn massacre that Donovan quotes unfortunately is 
not mentioned by Truman.  Yet if true, it would indicate that Truman, more so than Roosevelt and 
others, suspected the Soviets were responsible, and that there was evidence as early as 1945 which 
pointed in that direction.  Furthermore, Truman’s omission of this rather unsettling first 
conversation he had with Stalin doesn’t mean it didn’t take place.  It could very well be that 
Truman wanted to neglect mentioning it for other reasons—whether he simply regretted it, or felt 
it was simply un-statesman like for him to act in such a way to another head of state.   
 However, the final question, did Truman purposely suppress the Katyn massacre from the 
American people?  No definitive answer can be derived from his memoirs either.  And since the 
sheer scope of what Truman had to deal with after he became president was enormous, it is 
therefore more likely to say that he was far too disposed and engaged with other circumstances to 
actively take part in the cover-up the Katyn massacre, at least, not to the extent in which Roosevelt 
did.  Actually, Truman’s memoirs provides one with just a glimpse of the troubles that confronted 
him, especially considering he was thrusted into the presidency not knowing the exact details of 
the military, diplomatic, and economic conditions of the war effort.  “[I]n my first five days as 
President…I was beginning to realize how little the Founding Fathers had been able to anticipate 
the preparations necessary for a man to become President so suddenly,” Truman states.229   He 
goes on to say, that “[n]o Vice-President is ever properly prepared to take over the 
presidency…The President is the man who decides every major domestic and…foreign policy and 
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negotiates treaties.”230  What Truman is arguing is that the two offices are often separated from 
one another, for either political reasons, where fear over intentional or unintentional release of 
certain information can damage the sitting president, or because policy disagreements can 
undermine the executive’s authority.  In short, a vice-president is usually left in the dark 
concerning most matters, and is rarely consulted about specifics about policy.  This is no more so 
true when Truman became the Chief Executive.  He was completely unaware of the Manhattan 
Project and the atomic bomb; the agreements made by his predecessor at the Casablanca, Tehran, 
and the Yalta Conferences; current war projections; which nations were facing dire food shortages; 
the personalities and leadership qualities of both Churchill and Stalin, and much, much, more.  
Truman had to adapt quickly and decisively when he took office, and one can only imagine the 
amount of stress that was placed upon him after becoming President in the wake of a man who 
held the presidency for over a decade. 
 On a final note about Truman, perhaps the following passage from his memoirs illustrates 
how American perceptions regarding Russia fundamentally changed after the Germans invaded 
the Soviet Union in 1941, and how that new outlook, meant that too many good and decent people 
were blinded by Soviet true ambitions and nature:   
The American people now looked at Russia more sympathetically as the menace of 
Hitler became more frightening.  It was during this period of America’s growing 
sympathy for Russia that many extremists and pro-Russian supporters began to 
agitate for all-out support for the Soviet Union.  With this surge of sentiment for 
Russia, it had become the duty of those responsible for our security to take 
additional precautions to protect the vital interests of this government and nation.  
[But the] Russians exploited this sympathy with typical Communist duplicity by 
subverting sympathizers in many walks of life and duping scores of others.  Some 
of the most patriotic citizens, including top military and political figures, believed 
then that Russia could be trusted to help establish a durable peace in the world.231    
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This statement possibly sums up the Katyn debate in the U.S.  That is, many, not just in 
government, but elsewhere around the country as well, fell prey to their idealistic perceptions of 
the Soviet Union.  They thought that a government, led by a dictator, and regardless of its political 
ideology, could be bargained with and common ground could be sought.  Of course, what these 
very same individuals knew about Soviet atrocities during the height of Stain’s purges in the 1930s, 
raises other questions entirely.  
 
The 1951-1952 Congressional Hearings and the Declassified Documents 
In 1951, the House of Representatives decided to conduct a massive investigation on the 
killings at Katyn.  The enormity of facts, details, first-hand accounts, and intelligence reports from 
various governments involved in the affair, that were gathered and presented to the Congressional 
Hearings, provides overwhelming evidence against the Soviet Union for the massacre.  But it also 
draws attention to America’s role in whitewashing the event.  One piece of evidence in particular 
the members of the Congressional Committee draw attention to, is a report that was pieced together 
by George Earle III in 1944.  According to the Congressional documents, Earle’s report not only 
contained specifics about the massacre which implicated the Soviets, but that report was also given 
to Roosevelt in May that same year.  Before WWII, George Earle III was the former ambassador 
to both Bulgaria and Austria.  He later served as Roosevelt’s Special Emissary in Turkey for 
Balkan Affairs between 1944 and 1945.  When Earle testified before the Committee, he stated that 
his “agents,” a White Russian and three Red Cross contacts (two from Bulgaria and the other from 
Rumania) were at Katyn in 1944 when the Soviets began conducting their examinations of the 
grave sites (actually, this occurred the same time Harriman’s daughter was there in January).232  
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Earle claimed that his contacts managed to smuggle out pictures and other evidence from the scene 
of the crime, which were given to him sometime thereafter.233  So damning was their findings, that 
Earle decided to consult with the President directly.  He thought it was best to present that evidence 
in person rather than relay this information over official channels.  Coincidently, Earle was recalled 
for consultation by Roosevelt in May of 1944, and upon his return to Washington, Earle showed 
Roosevelt the documents and pictures that his contacts had smuggled out of Katyn.  But upon 
reviewing Earle’s report,  Roosevelt sternly replied, “George, this is entirely German propaganda 
and a German plot.  I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this.”234  Earle later testified 
that he left the report with the President, and asked Roosevelt too “please look those over again” 
because the weight of evidence against the Soviets was quite convincing.235  In addition, Earle told 
the Committee that he solicited the President’s permission to release his findings to the press, but 
Earle said he would only do so with Roosevelt’s approval.  According to Earle however, Roosevelt 
prohibited him from doing this, and nothing more was said about the matter.236  Did Truman, while 
pouring through the hundreds of classified reports after taking office come across the Earle report?  
Again, one can only speculate.  It’s just as likely to assume that Roosevelt disposed of the report 
Truman simply did not see it.  Or it may have never existed at all because Earle didn’t produce a 
copy of his report to the Committee.  But it might explain why Truman confronted Stalin at 
Potsdam about the deaths of Polish officers, as told by Snyder to Donovan.  Moreover, it may be 
the one source of information that led Truman to that conclusion after taking office.    
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The most relevant, if not conclusive evidence, that the Committee produces which 
illustrates America’s role in the plot to cover-up the crime, came from the testimonials of Colonel 
John Van Vliet and Colonel Donald Stewart.  Both of these American infantry officers were 
captured by the Germans during the North African campaign on February 1943, and were later 
sent to a POW camp (Oflag, IX A/Z) in Germany.  When the Germans discovered the bodies at 
Katyn, Nazi officials wanted the two U.S. Army officers (along with two other British officers) to 
go to the mass graves to inspect the sight for themselves.  But Van Vliet and Stewart testified that 
each vehemently protested against “this propaganda effort [by] the German[s].”237  While the 
Germans supplied the two Americans with written orders which forced them to go anyway, they 
were able to keep those orders with them throughout the remainder of the war.  Both also stated 
that although they were searched several times thereafter by other German guards, no German 
soldier removed those orders from their possession.  And they presented those German orders to 
the Committee to verify their claims.  Though the extent of their testimonials is far too detailed to 
explain fully here, it is suffice to say that neither Van Vliet nor Stewart held the Germans in high 
regard, and they were constantly suspicious of the Nazis’ motives while they were at Katyn.  In 
fact, both testified (separately that is) that the Soviets were their allies, and they were more inclined 
to prove that the Germans were attempting to deceive the Americans into thinking the Russians 
were responsible.  However, after inspecting the sight, and reviewing the evidence put forth by the 
Germans, and since it appeared to both Van Vliet and Stewart that the evidence “could not have 
been falsified and planted” by the Germans, both came away with the opinion that the “Russians 
had executed those men.”238 
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 Van Vliet and Stewart later testified to the Committee that in May of 1945—after the two 
were liberated from the German POW camp by American forces and returned to Washington that 
same month—it was decided that Van Vliet would report what they witnessed at Katyn to Army 
intelligence.  Van Vliet reported his observations to a Major General Clayton Bissell, who was 
Army Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Army Intelligence (G-2).  On orders of General Bissel, 
Van Vliet dictated his conclusions and remarks on what he observed at Katyn, which again, 
unequivocally stated that the Polish officers were murdered by the Soviets.  General Bissell then 
labeled the Van Vliet report “Top Secret,” and ordered Van Vliet “to maintain absolute secrecy 
concerning his report.”239  During General Bissell’s testimony before the Congressional Hearings, 
he claims that he forwarded that report directly to the State Department.   
However, State Department officials later gave statements to the Committee that had they 
received the report from Bissell, they would have most certainly remembered it because of the 
“political significance” the report represented.240  In addition, State Department regulations, as 
well as Army regulations, require a receipt of transfer for any top secret or classified document 
that is passed from one federal agency to another, which neither Bissell nor the State Department 
had in their possession.  The most troubling aspect in regards to his handling of the report, General 
Bissell “admitted to the committee that had the Van Vliet report been publicized in 1945, when 
the agreements for creating a United Nations organization reached at Yalta were being carried out 
in San Francisco, Soviet Russia might never have taken a seat in this international organization.”241  
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Therefore, Bissell labeled the report top secret because he “saw in it great possibilities of 
embarrassment” to the American government.242  Clearly then there was a consorted effort by 
General Bissell to suppress this information for political purposes.  In the Committee’s Final 
Report—which was declassified in 2012—regarding Bissel’s handling of the Van Vliet report, 
they concluded the following:  
Our committee is sending a copy of this report, and volume 7 of the published 
hearings, to the Department of Defense for such action as may be proper with regard 
to General Bissell.  We do so because of the fact that this committee believes that 
had the Van Vliet report been made immediately available to the Department of 
State and to the American public, the course of our government policy toward 
Soviet Russia might have been more realistic with more fortunate postwar 
results.243  
Is it probable that the Van Vliet report and the Earle report would have furnished Truman 
and others with important information on the crime at Katyn?  One can only speculate, and “what-
ifs” are never a good tool to measure when investigating historical events.  But further declassified 
documents show that in April of 1953, one year after the Committee released its initial findings to 
the American public, General Bissell—who at the time was retired from active service—did 
receive an administrative reprimand for his “dereliction” in not “properly safeguarding” the Van 
Vliet report.244  But as to the exact extent of Bissell’s reprimand, that unfortunately is not stated in 
the documents.  Yet another mystery arises from the Congressional Hearings.  Why was the 
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information about Bissell’s reprimand, and the Committee’s declaration to have the Defense 
Department take action against the General, classified for nearly sixty years?  What was the 
purpose for concealing this information for so long?  Since the Committee’s underling argument 
was to expose pro-Communist agents within the U.S. government, why classify this small piece 
of evidence? 
Other portions of the declassified files also raises accusations against the State Department, 
Army Intelligence, and other governmental agencies of the United States and their involvement in 
the cover-up of the Katyn massacre.  The following events however, took place during the war, 
not after.  But they are worth mentioning.  According to the Committee’s “Final Report,” three 
high-ranking American Army officers had testified that when General Bissell was in command of 
the agency, there was a pool of ‘“pro-Soviet civilian employees and some military in Army 
Intelligence…who found explanations for almost everything that the Soviet Union did.”’245  If this 
is true, who were these individuals?  How deep did the pro-Communist fervor in Army Intelligence 
stretch?  Of course, neither the Committee nor the Army officers who made this accusations 
specifically identified who these individuals are or were.  The Final Report also declares that news 
commentator, and head of the Office of War Information (OWI)—Elmer Davis—was the person 
responsible for broadcasting a May 3, 1943 address to the nation where “he accused the Nazis of 
using the Katyn massacre [for] propaganda” purposes.246  Davis’ acknowledged to the Committee 
that he reported directly to President Roosevelt while serving at the OWI, but he maintains that in 
this instance he was acting under his own initiative.  Yet one has to wonder, was Davis truly acting 
under his own initiative?   
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Indeed, the Final Report goes on to state that staff members at the OWI and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), “engaged in activities beyond the scope of their 
responsibilities” during the war.247  For instance, in early May of 1943, both agencies silenced 
radio commentators in Detroit and Buffalo, shortly after they began “broadcasting in foreign 
languages” that the Soviets “might be guilty of the Katyn massacre.”248  These radio pundits, who 
also happened to be Polish, became targets of the OWI and the FCC when they started discussing 
the facts of the crime on the open airwaves.  As a result, officials in the FCC and the OWI 
intimidated the owners of these radio stations, and informed them that unless their commentators 
refrain from discussing Katyn, then their broadcasting licenses’ might not be renewed.249  In 
response to those pressures, the owners ultimately acquiesced, and the Polish broadcasters from 
that point on only reported on “straight news items, and only those [put forth] by the standard wire 
services.”250    
Insofar as the State Department, on April 22, 1943, the Final Report produces a memo 
which states: “on the basis of the various conflicting contentions (concerning Katyn) of all parties 
concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking a definite stand in regard to this 
question.”251  Does this memo illustrate what George Kennan meant when he said that he fell into 
the “tacit rule of silence which was being applied at that time to the unpleasant subject in 
question?”252  Clearly the State Department, Army Intelligence, the OWI, and the FCC, are 
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responsible for the suppression of information about Katyn during the war.  But what about after 
the war?  According to the Final Report, the Committee members concluded that there “was no 
excuse for not using [Katyn for America’s] propaganda war truths” towards the Soviet Union after 
the war.253  The Committee then highlights an account by a witness for the State Department who 
testified that the Voice of America (which was controlled by the State Department) “did not 
broadcast the fact of Katyn behind the iron curtain…because they did not have sufficient facts on 
it.”254  Yet the Committee concludes in their Final Report, that answer was unconvincing because 
“the preponderance of evidence presented…about the cover-up came from the files of the State 
Department.”255  Thus, the Voice of America (VOA), according to the Committee, “in its limited 
broadcast” about Katyn during and after the war, followed a “wishy-washy, spineless policy.”256 
While this statement by the Committee against the VOA is a rather crude assessment, it 
does nonetheless demonstrate that there was a consorted effort by government officials to conceal 
the facts about Katyn from the American people.  In regards to the overall cover-up by the U.S. 
Government during and after WWII, the Committee claims, that they had “only scratched the 
surface” of the role in which the OWI, the FCC, and the VOA played in the suppression of 
information about the massacre.257  They further express, that Congress should conduct an 
independent investigation into these agencies to uncover how deep this conspiracy went.  But no 
such investigation has ever taken place.  Therefore, further research regarding the role of these 
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agencies should be investigated more thoroughly, then perhaps, the actors behind the whitewash 
of Katyn could be revealed.258    
 
Conclusion 
In the end, it is not all that unreasonable to assume that politics, and protecting the United 
States’ standing in the world, outweighed the decision to inform the American people by those in 
the U.S. government who had knowledge of the Katyn atrocity.  As for those individuals mentioned 
in this study, a common theme develops among them.  Each, to some degree, refrained from 
discussing the Katyn massacre and the United States’ response to the crime for a particular reason.  
George Kennan perhaps emerges as the least controversial figure, given his relatively open 
discussion on the matter, and the fact that he was a mid level Foreign Officer in the State 
Department.   And since many of the details and circumstances of the crime were being censored 
by the Roosevelt administration and the top echelons of the State Department and other federal 
agencies, it appears that his involvement in the whitewash of Katyn was nonexistent.  As for 
Averell Harriman, he may have been motivated by personal desires to remain silent on the issue.  
His devotion for Roosevelt was well-known, and Harriman thoroughly discusses his unyielding 
admiration and respect for Roosevelt throughout his memoirs.  Not to mention, beating the drum 
over Katyn most certainly would have tarnished his diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union.  
And Harriman most certainly valued the opinion of his daughter Kathleen, (who he also praises 
and holds in high regards in his memoirs).   Thus, for Harriman, Kathleen’s judgements concerning 
Katyn may have settled the issue.  Dean Acheson on the other hand, possibly surfaces as the most 
controversial figure.  His exclusion in his memoirs of the crime at Katyn, and his lack of significant 
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discussion on the Polish question in general, leaves one wondering what he was hiding.  Moreover, 
if the allegations are true that his law firm benefited financially from the Polish puppet regime of 
the Soviet Union, and since he was a prominent figure in the State Department when the lost Van 
Vliet report was either disposed of by State Department officials or Army intelligence, then if 
anyone in the above analysis is culpable for suppressing the massacre for either personal or 
political purposes, then it just may very well be him.  Truman on the other hand is another 
individual who refrained from discussing the Katyn controversy in his memoirs as well.  And since 
he often stated that the “buck” stops at the White House, then he, whether rightfully or wrongfully 
so, he must accept the ultimate blame for continued repression of this crime from the American 
people.   
But beyond the cover-up of the Katyn massacre, there are other reasons why studying this 
historical event is important for interpreting the political elements that eventually shaped Cold War 
policies.  Katyn demonstrates the role in which power politics play as sovereign states engage 
other nations in international relations when an affair such as Katyn arises and drastically alters 
the dynamics of those relationships.  Indeed, Churchill and Roosevelt decided to ignore this 
atrocity because the alliance with the Soviet Union was too important in defeating Nazi Germany 
and Imperial Japan.  The Polish Government-in-exile however, needed to establish which nation 
was responsible for the execution of the Polish officers, because they were an essential asset in 
rebuilding war-torn Poland after WWII.  Furthermore, the London Poles required American and 
British economic and political support in that endeavor.  Consequently, if the evidence from Katyn 
implicated the Soviets, then ensuring that a Communist subversion of Poland orchestrated by 
Stalin did not come to fruition, was also going to need British and American assistance.  As for 
the Stalin, he ordered the execution of Polish officers because they represented a class, one that 
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had the potential of undermining Soviet attempts to spread communist ideals over the less-
educated elements of Polish society in eastern Poland.  Eastern Poland was also important to Stalin 
because he wanted to regain Russian lands that were lost after WWI, and likewise desired to create 
a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany.  Moreover, some claim that Stalin 
used Katyn to his advantage.  His accusations that the Polish Government-in-exile was colluding 
with the Germans after the London Poles called for the International Red Cross to investigate 
Katyn, freed Stalin’s hands to delegitimize the Polish Government-in-exile, thereby forcing the 
other Allied powers to choose between either the greater (the Soviet Union) or lesser (Poland) 
contributors to the war effort.  And since Stalin knew the British and the U.S. would obviously 
choose the former, this allowed Stalin to establish a communist regime in Poland in the process.   
As for Truman, his hands were essentially tied when it came to the issue of Poland after he 
assumed office.  The Red Army was firmly embedded on Polish soil by 1945, and the breakdown 
of relations between the Soviet Union and the Polish Government-in-exile was completely 
irreconcilable.  In addition, perhaps Truman, and others, simply decided that retaliating against 
Stalin and the Soviets over the atrocious acts at Katyn was simply not worth the battle.  That is, 
did policy makers, at some level, believe that the United States was just as culpable in committing 
questionable acts during the war?  One could argue that the fire bombings of Dresden and Tokyo 
and the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by American forces could be perceived 
as highly questionable acts.  Still, others could claim that those actions were necessary evils to 
achieve a quicker end to Nazism and Fascism.  In the end, Truman too used the Katyn massacre 
for political capital.  The Congressional Hearings was chaired by Ray J. Madden, a Democrat from 
Indiana, and three out of the six members of the Committee were also Democrats.  In the 
Committee’s opening statement, Madden, along with the other Committee members, thanked 
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President Truman for whole “heartily” endorsing the hearings, and for instructing “all departments 
of the Government to cooperate 100 percent in presenting evidence and files to this committee.”259  
One has to remember, that the Korean War had been going on for nearly a year by the time the 
Committee started its investigation.  Thus, as Robert Szymczak reasons, Truman sanctioned 
Congress’ enquiry (even though Congress constitutionally needed no such approval) and instructed 
all Federal agencies to comply with the Committee’s request because highlighting past Soviet 
atrocities that took place during WWII, could then be juxtaposed to the events taking place on the 
Korean peninsula, which would bolster American support for the war effort there.    
On a much broader scale, the Katyn controversy raises other questions as well—beyond 
that of which nation was responsible and why the information and knowledge of the crime was 
concealed.  For instance, what did American leaders or military officials know about the Nazi 
concentration camps?  When did they learn of these events?  What was their response when they 
learned what the Nazis were doing to those they deemed as subhuman and undesirable?  
Furthermore, why did Congress not conduct a similar investigation like the Katyn inquiry for the 
thousands of American POW’s that were captured, tortured, and died at the hands of their Japanese 
captors during the war in the Pacific?  This is especially relevant considering many Japanese who 
engaged in such acts of brutality against American POW’s went relatively unpunished for their 
crimes.  Finally, there are aspects of the Katyn massacre that is still shrouded in mystery to this 
day.  Indeed, while approximately 15,000 bodies were discovered at Katyn, Anna Cienciala and 
her co-authors in Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment, discovered Soviet documents that 
illustrates that nearly 22,000 Polish officers were actually executed by the NKVD in 1940.260  
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These Poles however were not killed at Katyn.  They were removed from their Soviet POW camps 
and executed at other sites in Russia.  But as to where those locations are, that information 
unfortunately cannot be determined.  According to Cienciala, the Soviet documents don’t disclose 
their whereabouts, they only highlight that they were killed.  Thus, thousands of Poles to this day 
lay buried in undisclosed locations.  Katyn then has come to represent not just those who were 
killed in the forest during those days in the spring of 1940, but most importantly, for the thousands 
of Poles who were either slain by their Soviet captors, or died while being transported to prison 
camps during the Nonaggression period.  Finally, to this day, there still remains classified 
documents from the original 1951-1952 Congressional Hearings on Katyn.  We know in 1991 
Russia has taken responsibility for the crime, therefore, what possible information about Katyn is 
the U.S. government still keeping secret, and what is the possible reason(s) for this?   
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